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Abstract
The subject of this work is the analysis of level-transition and emergence prob-
lems. Philosophical argument is basically grounded on concepts of object identity
and manipulation. It is furthermore extended to criticism of the methodology of
bridge-hypotheses as proposed by methodological individualism in the social sciences. In
order to provide an actual example, the proposed methodology is implemented: Area of
application is the classical Kirk-Coleman-Model, a simulation of interaction behavior in
a three-person group. In order to meet the requirements of the proposed methodology
of level-transitory explanation the model is modified and implemented employing the
powerful Bayesian-Network formalism.
The author can be contacted by e-mail: Gero.Schwenk@web.de
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The question of level-transitory explanation lies on the very core of both individualistic
and collectivistic social science.
The possibility of individualistic sociology depends on a solution to this question,
and this question is commonly answered by the famous “Micro-Macro-Scheme,” which
goes back to McCLELLAND [36] and which is usually attributed to COLEMAN [12].
The core concept is to explain collective behavior from individual actions, to name the
levels considered. The same question of level-transition is answered in a different way
by collectivistic sociology: It is taken for granted that properties of collectives cannot
be explained across levels, because of an irreducible process of “emergence”. A classical
presentation of the positions is given by ALEXANDER et al. [1].
The continuing actuality of the question is reflected by recent works which discuss
the issues of reduction and emergence with reference to new theoretical developments
from the field of Philosophy of Mind, compare for example HEINTZ [20] and SAWYER
[51] [52].
Both level-transitory explanation and emergence are possible, and the intention of
this work is to provide a coherent philosophical treatment of the problem which is based
on new epistemological insights. Additionally, a further aim is to show an abstract but
actual implementation of level-transitory explanation.
We will see that the answers to the philosophical question of emergence are not so
easily obtained as proposed by the popular schools of individualism and collectivism.
In fact, the problem of level transition mixes ontology and epistemology, namely at the
particular definitions of object and level. Coherence of my treatment of this problem will
come at the cost of loss of sincerity in knowledge, namely in a way that compromises
both Logical Positivism and Critical Rationalism by the introduction of decision and
consequently meaning1 to Theory of Science. Employing this account, a criticism of
1I will rather relate meaning to the concept of use than to the concept of truth, to name my viewpoint.
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common individualistic methodology will follow. (The topics are treated in sections [2,3
and 6].)
Since an actual implementation of the philosophic considerations is part of this
work, employment of rather sophisticated mathematical methods is necessary. I will use
and introduce the so called Bayesian Network Formalism, which is a variety of probability
theory. Furthermore I will declare a procedure to define system models in the language
of Bayesian Networks. (Sections [4 and 5];)
The actual modelling concentrates on reformulation of the classical Kirk-Coleman-
model (KIRK / COLEMAN [29]) a simulation model of interaction in a three person
group, developed in the late sixties. After introducing the original work, the theoretic
circumstances of its modifications will be sketched. Subsequently, the modified model is
declared formally as a Bayesian Network. (These topics can be found in sections [7, 8 and
9].) I should note that, because of its simplicity, the model should rather be considered
as a toy application.
After a conduction of a sensitivity analysis of the modified Kirk-Coleman-model
(section [10]) a level transitional explanation is finally realized in accordance to the
proposed methodology (section [11]).
I hope the reader will accommodate to my rather packed style of writing. An
apology in advance: My personal focus was rather on coherence and precision than on
convenient readability.
Chapter 2
Level-Transitory Explanation and
Emergence
Within this section I will introduce my general approach to these subjects.
In both cases, level-transitory explanation and emergence, the task consists in de-
livering conceptual coherent explanations when faced with a phenomenon which can be
described on different levels of organization. (For instance on an individual and a societal
level.)
I will not try to give a straight ontological solution: By definition, the problem
poses that the different levels of the system assume the same status of reality. This raises
the question of how their properties should relate to each other, which again instantly
yields the general question on nature of properties and objects themselves.
2.1 Epistemic Account on Object Identity
Trying to solve the puzzle of relation between levels in purely ontological terms should be
hopeless, but a trick may exist to bypass this question. A solution which is based on on
epistemic argument would suffice for most purposes:
The first thing we have to start with, is the observation that objects (which might
be for instance persons, electrons or social groups) can apparently be identified as such,
regardless of their level of composition. The interesting question is now, what criteria are
necessary for guaranteeing such an identification?
My answer originates in the ontological concept of autonomy1 respectively locality
of the mechanisms which are defining an objects identity. This concept has been proposed
1In my use of the word autonomy is closer to isolatability than to self-regulation which is a stronger
assumption.
3
4 CHAPTER 2. LEVEL-TRANSITORY EXPLANATION AND EMERGENCE
by PEARL [47] in his account on causality.2
It should furthermore be noted the the concept of locality of mechanisms implic-
itly defines the concept of level, since the lower level is exactly the set of objects which
are (directly or indirectly) interacting by virtue of their defining mechanisms. This leads
to the conclusion that level transition might necessarily violate the concept of level and
therefore object identity.
Nevertheless, there exists the “trick” which was previously mentioned, namely the
preservation of object identity in nested sets of objects (as demanded by the problem) is
enabled by attributing autonomy of objects rather to conception than to reality. 3
The results are immediate: This way, by employing perceived autonomy, the defini-
tion of identity of objects on higher levels does not interfere with a description in terms of
the lower level (compare the sections [System] and [Macro States and Initial Conditions]).
As long as the higher level behaves as if it were an object I can call it such, regardless
of questions of composition. I will subsequently show that considerations regarding
causality result in the claim that perceived autonomy may be one of the best ontological
“estimators” one can get. (Compare section [Reduction and Manipulation].)
Consequently, because existence of elements on all levels and labels of their prop-
erties are granted by how the question is posed, the problem of level-transitory
explanation reduces to finding an adequate map from one level to the other.
2.2 Realization of Macroscopic Properties
Because of the above arguments, if a higher and a lower level event occur together,I
will say that the lower level event takes part in the realization of the higher level event.
Furthermore, since a higher level entity is always defined on a set of lower level objects, all
objects of this set will have to take part in an event in order to realize the macroscopic one.
Summarized, configurations of lower level events realize a higher level event. This
can be thought of as an additional definition of a specific higher level property.
It is important to notice, that following this argumentation the higher level prop-
erties are not proposed to be supervenient (SAWYER [51]), which means that the
higher level property is realized by the lower level objects and their relations, but is not
necessarily “irreducible” to these. Perhaps the most important point is, that realization
is something different from causation: The lower level objects are already causally
2PEARL defines the autonomy of an mechanism via considerations regarding conditional independence
of certain variables in scope. Exact definition is given by his criterion of Markov-Parentship.
3A neat additional consequence is the reduction of ontological assumptions. Nevertheless, this does not
hinder the existence of reality, it is just a more conservative point of view.
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determined by its defining lower level mechanisms. Realization adds nothing to this.
(Compare SCHLICK [54].)
2.3 Level-Transition
A direct result of the consideration of microscopic realization of macroscopic states is the
definition of a macroscopic state as a function defined on the configuration-space of the
lower level objects, resp. as a function of the systems state-space.
This function relates to the expressions on both levels and might typically be a
kind of classification of the systems state-space. Given this exemplary case of classifica-
tion, higher level statements are equal with collections (resp. aggregations) of lower level
statements, which fits to the argumentation of the last section.4
Practically, now level-transitional explanation means usually to deduce dependen-
cies between single microscopic objects and collections of them.5, followed by aggregating
(e.g. averaging) them over the defined classes of realization. Unfortunately, this will only
be feasible for small systems, since the size of the state-space will explode otherwise6
As mentioned in the [Introduction], the section [Level-Transition Instantiated] pro-
vides an implementation of the proposed methodology.
2.3.1 Bridge Hypotheses and Violation of Object Identity
The functions connecting the different levels, as introduced in the previous section, are
usually called bridge hypotheses (compare NAGEL [41] and OPP [44]).7 It should be
noteworthy to mention that above considerations expect bridge hypotheses to have no
explanatory power. If they had, they would necessarily violate object identity on the
lower level: Since this level is defined by the mechanisms of the objects it contains
(as stated in the section [Epistemic Account on Object Identity]), a bridge-hypothesis
mechanism would make the effecting macro-object a micro-object at the same time. A
further result would be causal over-determination, since a bridge hypothesis would exceed
the set of the lower level object’s defining mechanisms.
In order to avoid these paradoxes, bridge-hypotheses are required to be mere defi-
nitions. The core explanation takes place in the system which is defined on a single
4Following the argumentation of lower level realization, the map from the lower to the higher level is
requested to be a many-to-one map. Nevertheless it is possible for the higher level object to be defined by
different attributes, with some of them being elementary (non-decomposable). These elementary attributes
of the higher level will then necessarily be connected to the lower level via a one-to-one map. However, all
maps together will still embody the concept of realization for level transition to make sense.
5I will use the Bayesian-Network formalism for reasoning on microscopic level.
6Sampling the state-space might be an initial solution.
7I will give additional discussion on this concept in the section [Semantics and Bridge-Hypotheses].
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level which will be the lower one, because of its higher informational content. (Further
discussion of the topic can be found in section [Explicit Application of the Micro-Macro-
Scheme].)
Nevertheless, bridge hypotheses are very important concepts in social science since
they code assumptions on processes which cannot be considered in every detail. Their
inherent ontological paradoxy does not make them useless statements, as long it is
controlled.
2.3.2 Proxy-Descriptions
Given that a description of the lower level process cannot be found, an aggregate
description may certainly be used as a proxy for knowledge of the fundamental process.
Practically, this will be necessary in most applications, typically for reasons of lacking data.
For this purpose an additional assumption will be necessary: Aggregate measures
of the system (as they can be gained economically by sampling) usually need to be
backed up with assumptions on structural homogeneity in order to serve as a proxy
of the microscopic process. The assumption of homogeneity of unobserved structures
can be justified by an argument similar to OCKAHM’s Razor or LAPLACE’s Principle
of Insufficient Reason, which applies in this case as follows; Structural homogeneity is
the simplest assumption as well as the expectation of random structures where every
particular structure is assigned equal probability, because none can be preferred because
of ignorance.
2.4 Reduction and Manipulation
By employing this methodology, level-transitional conclusions can be logically achieved,
at the cost that the higher level seems merely more than a “useful manner of speech”,
how SCHLICK [54] called it.
But this may be true for everything. The definition of mechanisms (and therefore
objects) seems to depend on considerations on manipulation as causality might be
regarded generally (compare BISCHOF [5], PEARL [47] and VON WRIGHT in SOSA et
al. [61]).
Emphasized: Wether something is said to be an object might depend on our ability
to manipulate it.
Given this view, anything which can be attributed a use (a reason for manipula-
tion) could be said to be possibly real. Usefulness seems to me to be the boundary of
insight of reality: Given usefulness, logical coherence is just a means, depending on the
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features of the objects and mechanisms in focus.
This is the reason why I do not propose reductionism as a general ontology. It
has the advantage of logical coherence, but intuition of both logic and object identity
might be dependant on the needs of the human observer.
Assuming a level where it makes sense, while being reductionistically coherent only
during level transition might be a more practical approach.8
2.4.1 Hypothesis or Definition?
The above result may certainly seem peculiar from the viewpoint of Theory of Science
in its tradition of Logical Positivism and Critical Rationalism. (Compare for example
SCHNELL et al. [55] or SEIFFERT / RADNITZKY [56].) The reason for this is that
Theory of Science hides metaphysics (and thus ontology) in considerations on logical
structures of theories.
For example, I might be expected to answer the serious question wether a bridge
hypothesis is requested to be a “hypothesis”, in form of an implication, or a “definition”,
in form of an equivalence.
Let me show the syntactic difference between those forms of propositions. In the
case of equivalence, both antecedent and apodosis of the proposition are fixed. There
cannot be any variation in it. In the case of implication, the antecedent is free and subject
to variation. The point is that this difference fits nicely to the ideas of metaphysical
inertness (for equivalence) and productivity (for implication). These concepts are
necessary for the question to make sense.9
Returning to above question on bridge-hypotheses, it now seems that I am asked
to answer an ontological question and no formal one, although this is not explicit anyhow.
Needless to say that empirical methodology, being coherent to logicism, adheres to a
different concept of observation (and thus intelligibility of reality) than the one proposed
in the section on [Reduction and Manipulation]. Therefore the question wether bridge
hypotheses are expected to be “definitions” or “hypotheses” wether can only be answered
by regarding to the mentioned metaphysical considerations. The answer in my terms
8The pragmatic argument does not mean that I deny reality and truth or the need for ontology: it fits
to the idea of manipulation being the substrate of causality and is furthermore epistemologically rather
straightforward, as compared to the stronger criterion of correspondence between proposition and reality.
More of this in the section on [Aspects of Modelling].
9I just want to remark that definitions and hypotheses do not necessarily need to be represented by the
two mentioned constructs. Every computer program employs directed assignment-operators rather than
equivalences for representation of definitions. Syntax is simply a question for the range of its coherence
with semantics. As long as it works, it works. (Compare section [Aspects of Modelling].) Similar argument
is employed by BUNGE [7] in order to attack RUSSEL’s proposition of differential equations being the
only possible formulation of natural laws.
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is, that I request inertness being an attribute of bridge-hypotheses, but this does not
necessarily deny productivity on a specific level. (Compare [Reduction and Manipulation].)
According to a metaphysics of correspondence between proposition and reality, for
example Logical Positivism or its successor Critical Rationalism, this ambiguity would
be senseless and contradictory. But it is not for a weaker metaphysics of Pragmatism as
advocated in section [Aspects of Modelling].
2.5 Emergence
My preceding arguments concerning level-transitory explanation were based on an epis-
temic definition of the objects discussed. This now allows for an account on emergence,
which is also indecisive regarding ontology.
The previous problem took the higher level for predefined, which is obviously not
the case for emergence. Consequently, the task consists in defining its criterion in a way
that it can coherently serve as input for my approach to the problem of level transition.
This instantly yields in the following proposition: Collections of objects should be
attributed emergent properties if they behave autonomous (see above) on at least a
conceptual level.10
This is the case if the system or subsets of its elements exhibit self-regulation or
self-organization. The first means that the system compensates for outside disturbances
(BISCHOF [5]) while the second can bee seen as the tendency of a system to reach certain
steady-states (BERTALANFFY [4]) given a certain range of environmental conditions.
Both phenomena have in common that usually only a subset of the possible state-space
is realized, and that this realized states are functional (partial probability-increasing)
towards themselves (as mentioned) given a certain range of environmental conditions.
Now, by following the argumentation of the last section, I will define emergent
properties as classification11 of the auto-functional subsets of the systems state-space.
It is to be mentioned that this is no ontological definition of emergence, since it
builds again on the concept of perceived autonomy. I just turned the direction of
argumentation, compared to the approach to level transition: Self-regulation and
self-organization are strong grounds for the attribution of autonomy.
In order to conclude the discussion of emergence, I should emphasize the fact that
I am neither discussing properties of the auto-functional subsets of the systems state
space nor the process of reaching them. The question of steady states and derivation of
10With regard to systems, autonomy is encoded by definition of the systems boundary. (Compare
[System].)
11Or more generally as a function.
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emergent properties is beyond the scope of this project12, although I am very interested
in it.13
2.6 Remarks on Complexity
An argument from the emergentist part of Philosophy of Mind, is denial of the possibility
of microscopic modelling because of extremely complex patterns of “wild disjunction”
of the possible instantiations of a macro-state, as advocated by SAWYER [51] [52] and
mentioned by HEINTZ [20].
This argument is certainly challenging, but I will only give a short reply. Thanks
to the possibility to cope with multiple dependencies granted by the use of probability
theory, the “complexity” (e.g. difficult decomposability with respect to both structures
and mechanisms)14 of a system is not a problem anymore.15 The problem remains its
size.
If “wild disjunction” is interpreted before this background, a possible approach to
solve this problem may be investigating the structure of the auto-functional subsets of
the state-space, as defined in the emergence-section, for instance by considerations about
the evolutionary advantage (e.g. functionality) of hierarchical structures defined on the
systems components as done by SIMON. [59] [60]
Allow me a final remark: I guess that complexity, in a sense of exhausting human
conception, may be responsible for occurrence of the question on levels. If we are faced
with systems that are simple enough to be elementarily described, no one expresses
his considerations in terms of levels. This becomes an option, when systems begin to
refuse revealing information on their elementary processes and a gross-treatment becomes
necessary for understanding. 16
12One could say, that a practical solution of this questions (or simply a definitory bypass) is a prerequisite
for the epistemic approach on level transition.
13I only can recommend literature at the moment: the work of STEGMUELLER [62] provides an
excellent general account on self-regulation, while the work of BISCHOF [5] is extraordinary, both with
respect to teaching (it introduces time-discrete control-theory and information theory) and fundamental
research (it describes a method for defining semantics on evolutionary systems without having to invoke
intentionality). The works on General System Theory of BERTALANFFY [4] and Hierarchical Systems
by SIMON [59] [60] can be considered classical. Right now, NICOLIS’ and PRIGOGINE’s book [43] on
Dissipative Systems is on my bed table, but I will not finish it before delivering my thesis.
14This use of complexity is not necessarily isomorphic with the information-theoretic use of the word,
where Kolmogorov-Complexity designates the informational content of a signal by referring to the length
to the shortest program capable to produce that signal. This measure of complexity can be said to answer
the question how complicated a possible “explanation” of the signal might be. Im not deep enough into
this particular problem in order to treat it employing mathematical notions, but nevertheless the idea
should become clear.
15This is discussed in the “Mathematics”-section
16This certainly does not mean that the lowest level of consideration is necessarily “real”. Confounding
of the conception of being with the conception of manipulation may be true for every level.
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Chapter 3
Aspects of Modelling
Now I want to introduce the notions of model and model-calculus, followed by some con-
siderations about modelling as a scientific methodology. 1
3.1 Model
A model is essentially a map, but with certain characteristics: there exists 1. a so called
target set2 which is the system of interest, and 2. a so called image- resp. model set, into
which the map proceeds. The discriminating point is the intelligibility, or more general
usefulness of the image set compared to the target set. This is the reason for building
models.
Furthermore, target- and image set can be compared with respect to their compo-
sition: the subset of elements of the target which is not represented in the image is called
preteriton-class of the model-relation, while the subset of elements of the image which
have no complement in the target is called abundance-class (see TROITZSCH [65]). This
comparison is very interesting, because it shows the limitations of the model with regard
to its “original” and therefore allows to investigate the actual relation between target-
and model set.
3.2 Model-Calculus
Perhaps the most exciting and useful models are mathematical models. These are defined
by the fact that the image set is a subset of a domain of a calculus. I will call this
calculus operating on the image set of a model-relation model-calculus. A different way of
articulating this is to say that the model-relation defines a semantic on the calculus (see
CARNAP [9]).
1I apologize for introducing the method of modelling this late, although its omnipresence within this
work. It is still abstract enough, I guess.
2The direct mathematical translation would be preimage, which is a little bit cryptic for our purposes.
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The employment of a model-calculus allows 1. for “automatization” of the image
set by providing rules of computation and 2. proving assumptions about the general
behavior of the image set.
Certainly, a model-calculus may be hard to understand, but work invested here will
pay off: large problems will not be resolved without automatization while complicated
problems are longing for exactly defined semantics.3
3.3 Modelling as a Mindset
The advantages of modelling as an approach to science consist of flexibility and creativity.
Since it is not imperative to generalize the applicability of the image set and its associated
calculus beyond the scope of the target set, one is free to choose syntax and semantics
(or resp. the kind of model) according to demands of the problem and the simplicity
of the own mind. Certainly, gain of generality is not hindered by this approach, since
generality is a hallmark of good theory. But nevertheless, applicability seems to be
necessary criterion of a theory which corresponds to reality.
Applicability will be my central criterion for a good model, besides generality and
simplicity. Generality as a result of abstraction might well be demanded from a model of
complex processes. Therefore the claim for simplicity can be justified by considerations
regarding the own mental capabilities, as implied above.4
This “ethical” argumentation may sound inadequate to the subject. But even if it
looks differently, I am a believer with regard to synthetic truth. But I will not talk about
justification of the genuine truth of my models, given they are of limited use for my
purposes.
This criterion is weaker than for instance the most elaborate criterion of Critical
Rationalism as posed by LAKATOS [30]. But it allows thought to flow more freely than
the latter. I hold a similar attitude towards structuralism (see STEGMUELLER [63] or
TROITZSCH [65]). Rational reconstruction of a domain of knowledge may be of greatest
value, granted that there is already enough substance within this domain of knowledge.
My claim regarding acquisition of this substance is: One needs to dare new theory.5
3This is often not the case with MABS.
4One could also say that the two lower criteria flow from applicability by invoking stupidity and laziness.
5Certainly there is much more to know in the field of Theory of Science. Nevertheless, one thing is
never treated: the need for decision. The idea of truth contains too much ambiguity to give us specific
orders.
Chapter 4
A Sketch of Bayesian Networks
During this section I will briefly introduce the employed mathematical apparatus.
4.1 Sketch of the Method
While I proposed in the philosophy-section that level-transitory explanation can be
accomplished by aggregating dependencies between single microscopic objects and
collections of them, it remained unclear how these dependencies should be modelled
and deduced; especially, when the structure of dependency is rich but incomplete. This
question has been approached with the technique of bayesian networks.
In principle, the bayesian network formalism is a special formulation of probability
theory. The basic idea is as follows: By employment of the fundamental theorem of
probability calculus, a joint probability distribution is decomposed into a graph, resp.
a network. The nodes of this network represent the marginal distributions of the set
of random variables in question, while the edges connecting the graphs nodes represent
conditional probability distributions1.2
It should be furthermore important to note, that although being named “bayesian”, the
formalism is not necessarily connected with a bayesian3 interpretation of probability as
provided by the Cox-Jaynes-Axioms (BALDI / BRUNAK [3]: p.50 and JAYNES [24]). 4
The name “bayesian network” rather stems from the use of Bayes Theorem for abductive5
reasoning: While PEARL [47] advocates a bayesian standpoint, JENSEN [25] applies a
classical frequentist definition of probability.
However, the application of probability theory and especially bayesian networks to
1Actually, this is often called a “Graphical Model”.
2A good introduction to bayesian networks is JENSEN [25].
3Which reads subjectivist, non-frequentist.
4Although I am an enthusiast regarding bayesian theory, I will abstain from an introduction.
5Abduction is the inversion of deduction: A⇒ B, B is there, therefore A is more plausible;
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the problem is due to several advantages
• probability theory naturally allows inferring arbitrary dependencies between the
variables considered, while taking account of multiple dependencies and even mul-
ticausality6 (see JAYNES [24] and PEARL [47]). Usually, mathematical models
which are deducing macroscopic statements from microscopic theory are ignoring
structures of interdependence. Examples are the synergetic model of attitude for-
mation by TROITZSCH [65], [67] and COLEMAN’s [11]: pp.241 model of political
activity.
• Bayesian Networks allow for a rather convenient representation of systems: since
they can be modelled via local distributions (the nodes) and their probabilistic de-
pendencies (the edges), only knowledge on the elementary level is necessary. In
short, they naturally allow for microscopic modelling.7
• With respect to Multi Agent Based Simulations (MABS)8 (see GILBERT /
TROITZSCH [16], WEISS [69] and CONTE et.al. [13] for introduction), bayesian
networks have the advantage that they operate on a carefully defined mathematical
structure. This allows to clarify the relations between notions of the content-oriented
theory and the mathematical one, which is very important for interpretation of mod-
els. I should add, that although lacking mathematical rigor (as mentioned) MABS
easily allows for the modelling of structured dependencies.
• Bayesian Networks can be easily integrated with empirical data, as it is generally
true for probability theory.
All these advantages certainly come at a cost. The cost is computer-memory and lack
of speed.9Models easily become intractable, which makes simulation and MABS a better
choice for investigating their middle and long term behavior.10
So much for introduction of the technique and back to the question of inferring
dependencies between single objects and collections of them in systems with incomplete
structure of dependency.
Bayesian networks allow to calculate and express these dependencies in form of a
conditional probability distribution. What is left to do after computing the conditional
6The mode of inference in a probabilistic model is insensitive to hazards like structured independence
and nonlinearity: it is basically summation, resp. integration.
7I hold the view that probability is no ontic “force”: it rather stems from ignorance. And since I have
got enough of this, I may add a flavor of it to all of my models.
8Swiftly spoken, MABS model a system by representing its lower level entities as interacting software
objects.
9I experimented with a Dynamic Bayesian Network with twelve variables per time-slice, which could
only be solved approximately by sampling techniques like Likelihood-Weighting in my case.
10MABS and bayesian networks could certainly be combined with the latter being an analysis tool
operating on model generated data. During the course of this work this proved to be preferable compared
to direct modelling. Compare [Model Sensitivity].
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probabilities (which connect the realizations of a macro state with the single element
state) is aggregating.
4.2 Definition of Bayesian Networks
After above informal introduction to bayesian networks, I will additionally provide a
formal one.
First, I will briefly review some basic concepts of probability theory11. Then I will
give an introduction to the concepts necessary for building bayesian network models. For
this reason I will not talk about many details and especially the treatment of inference
algorithms.12
4.2.1 Decomposition of Joint Probability Distributions
The first concept I want to mention is the concept of a joint probability distribution.
This is a mathematical structure, where every joint occurrence of elements of a set of
statements is attributed a probability.
In frequentist thought, the joint probability distribution is the structure which codes a
probabilistic model and the most natural way of defining such a model is to generalize
observed frequencies of the variables in focus towards probability. Given this view, the
relationships between the elementary statements within the joint probability distribution
are defined by the Fundamental Theorem of Probability Theory:
P (a|b) =def P (a, b)
P (b)
(4.1)
The mentioned relationship is certainly a conditional probability. As can be seen, this
conditional probability is defined in terms of joint- and marginal probabilities, which both
can be easily gained by measurements of frequency. Certainly I can manipulate the formula
in order to gain:
P (a, b) = P (a|b)P (b) (4.2)
This equation shows the equivalence of the joint probability with a product of a
conditional- and a marginal probability.13 This formula can certainly be extended for
a joint of more than two variables, which leads to the Chain Rule:
11For a complete introduction, the reader may be referred to the works of JAYNES [24] and LARSON
[31], where the first is rich on philosophy and advocates a bayesian approach and the latter is a compact
introduction to classical theory.
12For a sound contact to the topic the reader is referred to BALDI / BRUNAK [3], JENSEN [25] and
PEARL [46] [47].
13The asymmetry in above definition (eq. 1) reflects a frequentist account to probability theory, demon-
strated for convenience of the reader.
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P (x1, ..., xn) =
∏
j
P (xj |x1, ..., xj−1) (4.3)
Applying the Chain Rule allows for the decomposition of a joint probability distribution
as a product of conditional- and marginal distributions.
This immediately results in the following semantic advantage: Now the system of
variables in scope can be described by their marginal distributions (as elementary prop-
erties) and their relationships in terms of conditional probabilities. So to speak, global
probabilistic propositions can be decomposed into local ones.
4.2.2 Graphs and Conditional Independence
Within the Chain Rule, indirect relationships between variables are represented explicitly.
This prohibits the design of a “wiring scheme” (or network model) of the system, since
it would contain unnecessary connections between the marginal distributions. This can
be avoided by accounting for conditional independence14 of the considered variables: Two
variables X and Y are said to be conditionally independent given Z if
P (x|y, z) = P (x|z) whenever P (y, z) > 0 (4.4)
Given, that our network model should map the directions of the relations 15and should
furthermore contain no cycles16, we can find the set of prior variables in this network
which makes a certain variable xj independent of all its other predecessors . This set is
called Parents of xj or paj . To eliminate all indirect connections towards xj out of the
directed and acyclic network, the Parents of xj need to satisfy the following condition:
P (xj |paj) = P (xj |x1, ..., xj−1) for all x1, ..., xj−1 prior to xj (4.5)
This is the Markov-Parentship-Criterion17 for directed acyclic graphs or DAGs18, how
such a “wiring scheme” is called.
The Parentship-Criterion can easily be applied to the Chain Rule. This finally al-
lows for the decomposition necessary for local representation of a joint probability
distribution by a directed acyclic graph by invoking the Chain Rule for Bayesian
Networks:
14More implications of conditional independence can be found at PEARL [47]:p.11, “Graphoid Axioms”.
15Usually one has to decide on the ordering of the variables by causal intuition. Nevertheless there exist
methods to extract causal orderings form data. PEARL [47]
16This is imperative for reasoning. Schematics which allow for cycles (like for instance block diagrams
in Control Theory) are implicit with respect to the order of computations, resp. time.
17The Markov-Parentship-Criterion is a way to define the autonomy, resp. isolatability of an object with
respect to certain,a priori known properties, as mentioned in the section [Epistemic Account on Object
Identity].
18A more formal definition of a DAG will follow in the next section.
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P (x1, ..., xn) =
∏
i
P (xi|pa(xi)) (4.6)
This equation, together with the prerequisite of representation of the conditional
independence-relations between the marginal distributions via a DAG defines a bayesian
network.
4.2.3 Inference in Bayesian Networks
Reasoning in Probability Calculus consists basically of projecting a joint probability dis-
tribution down to subsets of it: may that be joints, marginals or conditional probabilities.
So, the joint probability of two variables (Y,X) can be projected towards the probability
of the occurrence of a certain value yi of the variable Y by summing over the values of X:
P (yi) =
m∑
j=1
P (yi, xj) (4.7)
This is also called marginalization and is denoted the following way, if applied to distri-
butions:
P (Y ) =
∑
X
P (Y,X) (4.8)
conditional probabilities can be accessed by employing both fundamental theorem (eq. 1)
and marginalization:
P (y|x) =
∑
s P (y, x, s)∑
y,s P (y, x, s)
(4.9)
A strength of Probability Calculus can be seen in the natural ability of performing
abductive reasoning19 efficiently. The inversion of a conditional probability is accomplished
by Bayes Theorem:
P (y|x) = P (x|y)P (y)
P (x)
= L(x|y) (4.10)
The inverted conditional probability is often called likelihood.
Given that we gain evidence on the Values of some Variables within the network20,
we may wish to calculate the now unknown marginal resp. joint distributions on the
remaining variables (which would yield conditional distributions in both cases). In short,
19As mentioned before, abduction is the inversion of deduction: A⇒ B, B is there, therefore A is more
plausible;
20“Evidence” means to select a category of some variable with probability p=1, respectively to look only
at the part of the joint probability distribution which accords to what we learned about the actual state
of this variables.
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we might like to employ this knowledge in order to calculate the total effect of the
evidence, considering the structure of interdependence of the system of hypotheses in
scope . We could use above techniques to yield the results of interest.
But as mentioned, a necessary prerequisite for all computations but for abductive
reasoning is access to the joint probability distribution. This may only be the case in the
most seldom cases, since it grows exponentially with the number of variable values.
Thus the local representation by a bayesian network allows for the employment of
local computations in order to gain results which may be intractable by common
methods. This is accomplished by the various inference algorithms for bayesian networks.
Since efficient calculation with probability theory is a highly complicated matter, the
discussion of the several inference algorithms might exceed my capabilities. For more
information the reader is referred to PEARL [46], JENSEN [25] and GILKS et.al. [17].
Chapter 5
Probabilistic System Model
Since it is necessary to feed the machinery of probability calculus in order to get a run-
ning model, it might be helpful to formally declare the actual model-relation.1 This will
be accomplished by introducing BUNGE’s general definition of a system. Relating this
definition to bayesian networks, I will gain the definition of a probabilistic system model
which can be processed by probability calculus.
5.1 System
Usually, a system is conceived as a set of interacting elements2, which might be in our
case systems of individuals, collectives or institutions.
The eminence of the concept of system resides in the fact that it allows to repre-
sent a higher level entity in terms of its constituting lower level entities. It seems to
be a natural container of the concept of perceived autonomy (see [Epistemic Account
on Object Identity],[Level Transition] and [Semantics and Bridge Hypotheses]), whose
domain is given by the systems boundary.3
In accordance to BUNGE [6] I will formally define a system St at time t by the
triple of the sets of its components Ct, the bonding relations Bt between its components
and its environment Et.
St = 〈Ct,Bt, Et〉 (5.1)
With the lists of the systems components, bonding relations
Ct = {ct,1, ct,2, ...ct,n} (5.2)
1Another saying is that we declare a semantic on probability theory.
2A well known exception are the infernal works of LUHMANN, like [35].
3Nevertheless, for a complete level transition there is the need for translation of the notion defined on
the respective levels.
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Bt = {bt,1, bt,2, ...bt,m} (5.3)
and the components of the environment4, where the latter might often be condensed to
ein, the source of environmental input and eout, the sink of the systems output.5
Et = {et,1, et,2, ..., et,o} 7→ ECt = {et,in, et,out} (5.4)
I just want to mention that these components may be as well elementary objects, un-
bounded sets of objects or systems itself. A subsystem SS may be defined by having
subset relations of system S with regard to its composition set C and its bonding set B
while having superset-relations with regard to the environment set E .
SSt is a subsystem of St iff (CSt ⊆ Ct)&(BSt ⊆ Bt)&(ESt ⊇ Et) (5.5)
5.1.1 Graphical Representation
Systems can be modelled by a graph6 Gt whose nodesNt represent the union of components
set Ct and the environment set Et7 while its bonding set Bt maps8 to the set of edges EGt.
Gt = 〈Nt, EGt〉 (5.6)
given
Nt = Ct ∪ Et (5.7)
and
Bt 7→ EGt (5.8)
A natural representation of a graph is an illustration like [Figure 5.1].
5.1.2 Unfolding and Transition Representation
The representation of systems may be extended towards mapping the model in time. For
this, I will define a transition composition Cts(t,t+1) by uniting the composition sets Ct and
Ct+1, thus duplicating C, given the special case that it is invariant in time.
4Note, that all that elements are indicated over time.
5Such a compression would certainly reduce the bonding set.
6The term “graph” does not necessarily refer to a picture, although network images are great visual
representations of the mathematical structure of a graph.
7Environment influences are thus represented explicitly in the graph and thus the environment elements
are united with the set of nodes.
8I leave this map unspecified, since it depends on the functional dependence of the respective coupled
components. Directed edges and conditional probability tables defined on it will become handy in my
example.
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Figure 5.1: Example Drawing of a Graph
Cts(t,t+1) = Ct ∪ Ct+1 (5.9)
The same way, a transition environment Ets(t,t+1) is defined on the respective environ-
ment sets Et and Et+1.
Ets(t,t+1) = Et ∪ Et+1 (5.10)
This is completed by definition of a transition bonding Bts(t,t+1) coupling the elements
of both the transition composition Cts(t,t+1) and the transition environment Ets(t,t+1) via
the bonding set Bt+1 over time, given its element bonding relations have an origin in Ct
or Et.
Coupling is achieved by locating the respective bonds root in the domain of time t
and its target in the domain of time t+ 1. This is called unfolding of the bonding set.
Bt+1 7→unfolding Bts(t,t+1) | ( origin components of bi,t+1) ∈ (Ct ∨ Et) (5.11)
Now I am able to define the transition representation Sts(t,t+1) of the system S between
times t and t+ 1.
Sts(t,t+1) = 〈Cts(t,t+1), Ets(t,t+1),Bts(t,t+1)〉 (5.12)
5.1.3 Transition Graph
Equivalent to the procedure employed to yield the graphical representation of the system, I
now define a transition graph Gts(t,t+1) on the transition representation Sts(t,t+1) by uniting
the respective composition and environment sets Cts(t,t+1) and Ets(t,t+1) to the set of nodes
Nts(t,t+1)while mapping the bonding set Bts(t,t+1) on the set of edges EGts(t,t+1). This is
expressed by:
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Gts(t,t+1) = 〈Nts(t,t+1), EGts(t,t+1)〉 (5.13)
with
Nts(t,t+1) = Cts(t,t+1) ∪ Ets(t,t+1) (5.14)
and
Bts(t,t+1) 7→ EGts(t,t+1) (5.15)
5.1.4 Representation in Time: Temporal Graph
Graphical representation of the system in time is gained by definition temporal graph
Gtemp(t:t+n) representing the system from time t to time t + n by concatenation of the
transition graphs Gts(t,t+1) to Gts(t+(n−1),t+n). Given indication of the systems sets over
time, this is accomplished by uniting the respective transition graphs.
Gtemp(t:t+n) = Gts(t,t+1) ∪ Gts(t+1,t+2) ∪ ... ∪ Gts(t+(n−1),t+n) (5.16)
If the structure of the transition graph does not change over time, one could say that the
transition graph is unrolled in time.
5.2 Bayesian Network Representation
Now I want to apply the results of the last subsections to the problem of defining
a bayesian network on the system. The first conclusion is that the temporal graph
Gtemp(t:t+n) can be used to define the structure of a bayesian network modelling system
over time, given that its edges are directed. Such a temporal bayesian network is usually
called a dynamic bayesian network, although time is represented explicitly.
We need to define the conditional probability distributions attached to the edges.
Recalling the chain rule for bayesian networks
P (n1, ..., nn) =
∏
k
P (nk|pa(nk)) (5.17)
We identify the term nk|pa(nk) with the subset EGpa(nk) ⊆ EGtemp(t:t+n) of the set of
edges of the temporal graph Gtemp(t:t+n) which point towards the node nk, given that the
index k is a mapping of the time-explicit indication introduced in the [System]-section.
EGpa(nk) = EGtemp(t:t+n) |(egj pointing towards nk) ∈ Ntemp(t:t+n), nt,i 7→ nk (5.18)
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What finally needs to be mapped is the bonding information BI exceeding the defi-
nition of the existence and direction of edges on the conditional probability distribution
P (nk|pa(nk) attached to EGpa(nk).9
BI(EGpa(nk)) 7→ P (nk|pa(nk) (5.19)
This map can be arranged by either theoretic deduction of the probabilistic relation
between the components in scope, or by learning the relationships from data (see
BALDI/BRUNAK [3] and PEARL [47]).
Finally, if the joint probability distribution can be composed by invoking the chain
rule for bayesian networks, the formulation of a probabilistic system model is achieved.
9As remarked in the section on [Graphical Representation], the map from elementary to graphical
representation was left unspecified because of the implicitness of the actual functional dependence between
the elements of the system. The bonding information BI is exactly the explication of this unmapped
functional dependence.
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Chapter 6
Methodological Individualism
Now, after having introduced the foundations of level transitory modelling, I will discuss
my philosophical approach to the problem of level-transition in relation to its widespread
equivalent in the social sciences, the Coleman Micro-Macro-Scheme (COLEMAN [12]). I
should note that although it is named after James COLEMAN, its first occurrence can be
found in McCLELLAND’s “The Achieving Society” [36]1.
6.1 The Micro-Macro-Scheme and Methodological Individ-
ualism
In the “Aims”-section, I mentioned the Coleman Micro-Macro-Scheme as a central
starting-point of my work and promised an introduction into the subject. This scheme
is very important for individualistic social theory, because of its ability to connect
individual behavior with collective dynamics. I will start by referring to [Figure 6.1]
in order to provide an overview over its hypotheses. As mentioned, the Micro-Macro-
Figure 6.1: The Coleman-Micro-Macro-Scheme
1Thanks to Karl Dieter OPP for this hint.
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Scheme can best be described as a typology of the hypotheses necessary to accomplish
a level-transitory explanation. The hypotheses substituting the collective (or macro-)
hypothesis during individual-based explanation can be classified as Bridge-Hypothesis2,
Individual-Hypothesis (resp. Action-Hypothesis) and Aggregation-Hypothesis.
Before examining these hypotheses in detail, I want to discuss the main assump-
tions of this scheme. The first assumption is certainly systemicity of the social realm,
or in other words, that a social entity is a composite of lower level entities. The
second assumption is, that the lower level entities are persons which are connected by
their respective actions. This is the founding assumption of so called “Methodological
Individualism”.
6.2 Explicit Application of the Micro-Macro-Scheme
You wont be surprised to read that there is much discussion concerning the notion
of Methodological Individualism. There exist several attempts to formulate it, or
respectively its most usual formulation, the Micro-Macro-Scheme, in a way that allows
for the occurrence of emergent properties.
A short excursion to the actual practice of level transitory explanation may be
necessary to clarify the associated problems.
One frontline is the question how the Individual-Hypotheses should be instanti-
ated, 3 which certainly shifts the focus from level-transition to microscopic theory and
effectively relabels the problem while displacing it into the particular instances of the
microscopic theories. Following this tradition, a level-transitory-explanation consists of
determining the initial-values of the microscopic hypotheses, deducing their consequences
and averaging the results. This way, the separate hypotheses of Micro-Macro-Scheme are
applied one-to-one. A good introduction of this procedure can be found at OPP [44].
The interesting point is, that a microscopic approach to level transition, (as de-
signed in the respective section) can certainly be interpreted as an implicit version of this
procedure. The reason for this is that a systems state can certainly be interpreted as
initial condition for the components mechanisms.
Nevertheless, a conventional approach which tries to instantiate the Micro-Macro-
2More on this type of hypothesis in the sections [Level Transition] and [Semantics and Bridge Hypothe-
ses].
3This discussion can be followed in past issues of “Koelner Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie und Sozialpsy-
chologie” (KZFSS). The adversaries, all members of the “Rational-Choice” enterprise, consisted of LIN-
DENBERG [33], [34] and ESSER [15], who advocate a theory-driven microeconomical approach, and on
the other hand KELLE and LUEDEMANN [27], [28] and OPP and FRIEDRICHS [45] who are more prone
to an empirico-statistical paradigm similar to those of empirical social research. A recent contribution to
the subject is given by DAVIDOV / SCHMIDT [14].
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Scheme by trying to explicitly conclude with its classes of hypotheses is logically or
methodologically flawed. This is because of two reasons which already have been
introduced in the section on [Level-Transitory Explanation and Emergence]:
First, an elementary (which reads “not composite”) description of a macroscopic
state is inconsistent with the idea of a composite system, which is constituting for the
problem of level-transition. A elementary description of higher level entities can not be
uninformative in the sense defined in the section on [Bridge Hypotheses and Violation
of Object Identity]. Therefore coherence of object identities on both levels, which is
imperative for reasoning, cannot be maintained in this case. Certainly making this
problem implicit by shifting it into discussions about initializations of SEU-Theory will
not solve it.4 Discussion of this topic is given in the next section.
And second, a map from notions of composite system structure to notions of macroscopic
states is many to one- and therefore not invertible map. Because of this syntactically
elementary5 description of a systems macroscopic state lacks the possibility to map its
structure and is therefore only feasible for structureless phenomena. (These seemed to
deliver a template for microscopic modelling until recently.6) A technique which copes
with more complicated phenomena is required to map the relevant structure of the
system. This further disqualifies the one-to-one application of the Micro-Macro-Scheme
to many cases of interest.
6.3 Macro-States and Initial Conditions
It can be easily seen, that my arguments in the last section attacked merely a method
of defining initial-values for an individual hypothesis, and not the individual hypothesis
itself. This is not accidental since the research programme of the Sociology of Rational
Choice identifies the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) Hypothesis as its very core.
(Compare for instance COLEMAN [12] and KELLE/LUEDEMANN [27].)
Shifting the question of macroscopic properties and emergence into the initial con-
ditions allows to shield the individual hypotheses of the joint theory from doubt, resp.
4The discussion about theoretical “richness” or “abstinence” of bridge-hypotheses, as discussed in
KZFSS, is an example for this. Focus of argumentation is the question how to gain valid instances of
SEU, and not how to bridge levels.
5In the sense of CARNAP [9], who distinguishes between “elementary” and “complex” formulae and
notions, an elementary notion is one that cannot be decomposed within a given system of axioms.
6Possible examples are so called “Mean-Field-Models”. Since a mean is the “balance point” of a distri-
bution, all its values can be understood as to be balanced against each other. The structure of interaction
is treated as complete, which avoids the necessity for a detailed view on the lower level process. The
models of TROITZSCH [65], [67] and COLEMAN [11]: pp.241 show such a characteristic, as mentioned.
Although I am advocating structural modelling in this work, I have to confess that assumptions of struc-
tural homogeneity might be necessary for the most real problems. One needs to work with the data one
can get and I would not trow away useful methods like HLM or Bayesian Hierarchical Models. Detailed
discussion is given in section [Proxy Descriptions].
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from the problems associated with level-transitory explanation.7
A striking example for the synonymous use of “Macroscopic State” and “Initial
Condition” is OPP’s ([44]: p.90-105) introduction to the subject. He tries to explain
the disintegration of a public audience by application of the macro-micro-scheme: Rain
pouring on the audience is defined as “collective attribute” and employed to initialize the
individual process of decision, wether to stay or to leave.
Certainly, “absence of rain” is no constituting property of a public audience. Situ-
ations are simply taken for collectives. Rightfully, I should note that OPP shares this
error with his theoretical adversaries LINDENBERG [33] and ESSER [15], as well as
eventually with DAVIDOV and SCHMIDT [14].
6.3.1 Semantics and Bridge-Hypotheses
Certainly the synonymous use of “bridge hypothesis” and “initial condition” avoids
contact with the actual problem of level transition. I will now discuss that problem with
regard to the definitory “delicateness” of bridge-hypotheses.
As far as I know, the term “bridge hypothesis” was coined by NAGEL before the
background of explaining one theory via another, denoting a hypothesis which relates (or
translates) notions of the different theories (Compare NAGEL [41] and SCHEIBE [53].).
It should be furthermore noticed that NAGEL’s argumentation proceeds on a level of
theoretic statements .8
In our case, the problem faced in the attempt of reduction consists in delivering
definitions on the objects and properties defined on the different levels which are
semantically consistent and allow for conservation of object identity on both levels. This
implies the coherence of the respective definitory models on both image- (as postulated
by NAGEL) and preimage / target - level.
This coherence can be gained by introducing a third model, which maps the rela-
tions between the preimage-sets on both levels. In my case the (rather implicit) model
is a theory of knowledge and modelling which results in the assumption of perceived
autonomy of objects. This assumption connects the “designata” on both levels.
I should mention, that in my view this discussion is usually no issue in sciences
which employ the notion of a system rather than of higher level entity. The notion of
system seems to be a natural container for the idea of perceived autonomy, as can be
seen by the frequent discussions regarding systems boundaries (compare the section on
7I do not judge empirical correlates of the SEU-Hypothesis as being functionalities of social processes.
Therefore this argument is not a serious attack on the Rational-Choice paradigm. Nevertheless, it could
be such for a more “socialized” theory.
8The point is made very clear on [41]: p.364.
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[System]).
As stated in the section [Bridge Hypotheses and Violation of Object Identity] I do
not expect any explanatory content from bridge hypotheses: they are serving as mere
definitions with the explanation taking place on a single (namely the lower) level.
Above considerations are targeting a single result: Discussion on the logical structure of
bridge-hypotheses will not save us from defining the objects in scope in a way that keeps
their identity intact.
I will close the discussion with the following summary. Logical coherence on the
model-level is not enough and the ability to initialize the proposed hypotheses is a
necessity for any deduction. Nevertheless, this should not be attempted by employing a
bridge-hypothesis due to the problem of violation of object identity.
6.4 Deduction of Micro-Macro-Hypotheses
In order to conclude this chapter I should relate my approach to the Coleman Micro-
Macro-Scheme.
In a nutshell, aggregating over the respective microscopic deductions yields an in-
stantiation of an arbitrary hypothesis taken out of the scheme, as discussed in the sections
[Realization of Macroscopic Properties] and [Level Transition].
Furthermore, I might add that this approach is perfectly coherent with COLE-
MAN’s own writings: In the meta-theory chapter of “Foundations of Social Theory”,
he argues that the hypotheses of the scheme should be best thought of “as macro-level
generalizations which might be predicted as deductions of a theory.” (COLEMAN
[12]:p.20, no accentuation in the original;) A microscopic model is exactly such a theory.9
9Honestly, I should add that such a microscopic model should only be accessible in cases of small groups.
For different applications the definition of entities on a larger scale could be attempted, thus “lifting” the
micro-level as it is done by invocation of corporate actors (compare COLEMAN [12]).
30 CHAPTER 6. METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM
Chapter 7
The Kirk-Coleman-Model
In order to be finally able to present an actual instance of the proposed methodology I
chose the classical Kirk-Coleman model as exemplary application. Although it has been
modified in order to meet modern theoretical standards it should be noted that it is a
very simple example which could be (and has been) easily treated without the application
of sophisticated methods like bayesian networks.1 However, I will begin the discussion of
the Kirk-Coleman model by sketching the original work.
The so called Kirk-Coleman Model originates in the late sixties and is part of an
early attempt to explore the possibilities of both mathematical- and computer mod-
elling in the social sciences by constructing various models of interaction behavior in
a three-person group. Not surprisingly, the models discussed in the article (KIRK /
COLEMAN [29]) differ in theoretical content due to the calculi applied. Namely, KIRK
and COLEMAN construct two models: first, a microscopic differential equation system
and second, a stochastic simulation model 2 of the group process. The differential
equation system proceeds analogously to an earlier macroscopic model of SIMON.3 The
stochastic simulation model has been named “Kirk-Coleman Model” by several authors.
This work is similar to the original, where gaining direct sociological insights seemed to
be only a secondary goal after the testing of freshly accessible methods.
1Nevertheless, the reader should bear in mind that the circumstances of this work did not allow for
empirical modelling and exciting models are not so easily constructed out of the blue.
2It may be important to notice that a stochastic simulation is not necessarily equal with a numeric
solution of a system of stochastic differential equations, since the former is not necessarily constrained to
the mathematical notions of the latter. One can feel KIRK and COLEMAN’s freshly gained “freedom” in
the description of their simulation model.
3Since I was satisfied with KIRK’s and COLEMAN’s description of the model, I did not access the
original work.
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7.1 Simmel’s Remark
The authors begin introducing the theoretic background of the model by citing (KIRK
/ COLEMAN [29]: pp. 171) a remark of the beginning of the 20th century sociologist
SIMMEL [57].4 According to his observations three-person-groups usually disintegrate
into a pair and an isolated person. While the persons constituting the pair have relatively
strong ties, their relationship to the third person, the isolated one, is substantially weaker.
They conclude, that according to SIMMEL’s hypothesis a situation with balanced
strength of the relationships between the three persons is immanently unstable. Further-
more they state, that the assumption of the specific equilibrium state of a pair and an
isolated person is not trivial since different possibilities are thinkable.
Finally, KIRK and COLEMAN remark that the hypothesis demands only a mere
“tendency” in the behavioral patterns of the triad (how the three-person-group may
be called). Everyday experience and empirical research were both giving support and
counterexamples to the Simmel-Hypothesis, while the tendency to decompose into the
postulated pattern is supported by empirical findings of BALE and MILLS.5
7.2 The Homans-Hypotheses
KIRK’s and COLEMAN’s second theoretical starting point are psychological hypotheses
concerning interaction behavior, developed by HOMANS [22] [23] 6, which had already
been applied in the mentioned group-level model developed by SIMON.
The cental theoretical aim of the study of KIRK and COLEMAN was to investi-
gate if the system-level predictions made by the Simmel-hypothesis could be explained
by application of the psychological hypotheses of HOMANS.7 I will now provide a short
sketch of the hypotheses.
7.2.1 Social Behaviorism
HOMANS could be described as a “social behaviorist”. His work exhibits the simplicity of
elementary notions of behaviorism as well as its basic assumption of reinforcement learning.
Nevertheless, his hypotheses on interaction behavior seem to force him to employ
4I have not been able to locate the mentioned remark exactly, because the book is very unstructured.
The reader may be referred to [57]: pp.106, where chances seem to be best.
5These are citations of KIRK and COLEMAN [29]. Results for a six-person group can be found in
MILLS [37].
6KIRK and COLEMAN cite an earlier work of HOMANS, “The Human Group” (German translation:
“Theorie der sozialen Gruppe” [22]). Nevertheless, I will refer to “Elementary Social Behavior” [23] which
summarizes HOMANS’ theoretic results.
7As you might have noticed, this is an exemplary case of level-transitory explanation: group-level
phenomena are to be explained by hypotheses connecting individual properties.
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behavioristically bended versions of such notions as “feelings” or “liking”. I will come
back to this later in the section on [Similarity and Attraction].
7.2.2 Mutual Reward and Interaction
HOMANS’ ([23] p.181-184) fundamental argument is the possibility of people to act as
mutual sources of reward. Since humans learn to show activities which maximize their
reward, they will, ceteris paribus, begin to mutually reward themselves, as long one person
(even accidentally) starts the process by showing behavior which is rewarding for the other.
Additionally, he assumes that reward and activity “targeting” this reward are somehow
proportional on a not explicitly defined scale, thus allowing for a smooth incrementation
of the intensities of mutual reward.
Interaction behavior is furthermore conceived to be only a special case of above
argumentation, where the functioning of the process of mutual reward is enforced by,
how HOMANS calls it, the general reinforcer of liking (or social approval, which is in
HOMANS’ view the according operant).8
7.2.3 Condensed Hypotheses
Usually, the reinforcement argumentation is only applied in condensed form, resp. in
form of the following deduced hypotheses (see HOMANS [23], KIRK / COLEMAN [29],
TROITZSCH [66] 9 ):
Hypothesis 1: Liking ↗ Interaction
Hypothesis 2: Interaction ↗ Kiking
Or in words, liking increases interaction and interaction increases liking.
8HOMANS’ original formulation is somewhat different and more complicated, although it should be
equivalent with respect to the central issues. [23] p.181: “The more valuable to a Person a unit of activity
Other gives him, the more often he will emit activity, including sentiment, rewarded by Others activity. ...
Now one of the activities Person may give to Other is the generalized reinforcer called social approval; and
we have seen in recent chapters that the more valuable to Person is the activity Other gives him, the more
valuable is the approval or liking Person gives Other. ... One of the possible consequences of the first two
propositions taken together is the following third proposition: the more valuable to Person the activity
Other gives him, the more valuable the approval he gives Other and [originally emphasized] the more often
he emits activity, including sentiment, to Other. To put the argument more crudely, if Other does Person
a service, Person is apt to like him and interact with him often.” [23] p.183: “If they interact at all, they
emit activities to one another; and if no special factor is present that might bias systematically their values
or their activities, the chances are that each one will find some of the other’s activities valuable, if only
because they may be obtained at less cost from him than from a third party at a greater distance: ...
And to the extend that each finds the other’s activity valuable, each is apt to express favorable sentiment
toward the other. For this reason, an independent increase in interaction between persons is apt to be
associated with an increase in liking between them.”
9The formulations might differ somewhat.
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These two hypotheses are the theoretical foundations of the various models invoked in
the article of KIRK and COLEMAN for the attempt to instantiate the Simmel-Hypothesis.
Finally, I should again emphasize the fact that these formulations abstract from
the more fundamental hypothesized process. The condensed Homans-hypotheses are only
projections of iterative instantiation of the same hypothesis of reinforcement learning in
the involved individuals.
7.3 The Kirk-Coleman-Model
After having introduced scope and theoretical foundations, I will informally describe the
stochastic simulation model.
As mentioned before, the Kirk-Coleman-Model is a microscopic simulation of the
assumed process of interaction in a three person group. The program instructions 10
modelling the individual behavior are mapping the condensed versions of the Homans-
Hypotheses as they are declared in the last section. A single turn of the simulation
proceeds as follows (KIRK / COLEMAN [29]: pp. 176).
• Every Individual i = 1, 2, 3 chooses one of the other individuals as preferred inter-
action partner. The probability of choosing an individual j is proportional to the
liking for that individual.
• A single individual starts interaction with a probability proportional to a (at least
semantically macroscopic) parameter of dominance. As a result, the choice needs
not to be necessarily reciprocal.
• The realized interaction is counted and its initiator is given a reward K with a
certain probability RA. If the choice has been reciprocal, the interaction partner is
given a reward K with a equal probability RA. If the partner has originally chosen
a different individual, he is given the reward K with a different probability RB.
• The reward K is added to i ’s liking for the individual j it has just interacted with.
• Finally, all sympathies are lowered by multiplication with a shrinkage-parameter,
thus ensuring that recent interactions have an greater effect than those further in
the past.
This procedure is iterated until the desired number of interactions is reached. 11
10The original program has been written in FORTRAN, but only the control flow is available in the
article.
11The maximal number of iterations calculated by KIRK and COLEMAN was 1000.
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7.4 Various Group-Interaction Models
As mentioned, there exist several models which are implementing the Homans’ Hypothe-
ses, three alone within the scope of the article of KIRK and COLEMAN (namely their two
models and SIMON’s group-level model). A fourth model has recently been developed
by TROITZSCH [66] [67], which extends the Kirk-Coleman-Model with respect to the
number of agents12 considered.
It is interesting to observe how the models differ with respect to the constraints
imposed on them by the different calculi and possibly by techniques of software-
engineering. The latter are constraining the image set of a model in a similar way a
calculus would do, because both are pre-structuring the image-set of the possible models.
An indicator for this effect is the “dominance” parameter in the actual Kirk-Coleman-
Model. It seems to result from the necessity of sequentialization of the modelled process.
There seems to be no theoretical justification for the notion of dominance, since it
is first a macroscopic concept defined on more than a single individual, and second,
the microscopic differential equations model of KIRK and COLEMAN ([29]: pp.174)
is lacking this parameter. This is not surprising, since all equations in a differential
equations system are solved simultaneously per definition.
Today sequentialization of simulation models is usually accomplished either by the
software employed (by an interpreter like MATLAB for instance) or by making auxiliary
assumptions in special program structures.13 In simulation studies it is unnecessary to
mix the semantics of theoretical notions with technical assumptions as it is the case with
the mentioned parameter of dominance.
12By “agent” I will denote the model-representation of an actor.
13So, every MABS has structures where the interactions of the agent-objects are related to each other,
i.e. are synchronized or a-synchronized. The common practice to assign “threads” to the agent-objects
and thus assign them own processes makes no exception: It just passes the task to the operating system
and to code hidden in the depth of the memory.
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Chapter 8
Modification of the
Kirk-Coleman-Model
Originally, the bayesian network-implementation of the Kirk-Coleman-model had been
intended as a proof of the viability of the proposed method of level-transitory explana-
tion. But when I started the actual modelling and tried to get rid of the semantically
macroscopic parameter of dominance, I think I overshot by making the model “better”,
i.e. more coherent and fashionable.
Since experience is the thing which one gets only after having needed it, the now
modified model can not directly be compared with its original. Nevertheless, it still shows
the applicability of level-transitory explanation and resulted in interesting theoretical
discussion, which shall be demonstrated within this section.
8.1 Homans-Hypotheses and Expected Utility
Within this section I will argue that the Homans-hypotheses (as a special case of
reinforcement learning) along with the Subjective-Expected-Utility (SEU) hypothesis
can be interpreted as special cases of considerations regarding adaptation of systems to
environmental conditions.
My interest in Expected Utility is driven by the fact that it is rather explicitly
formulated and widely welcomed in different disciplines.1
8.1.1 Subjective Expected Utility Theory
I will begin with a short sketch of subjective expected utility theory since the theory of
HOMANS is already introduced.
1I would certainly resist the temptation to dogmatically propose it as standard template for models of
human behavior.
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SEU has its foundations in the Theory of Games developed by VON NEUMANN
/ MORGENSTERN [42], where maximization of the so called expectation function (or
Neumann-Morgenstern-equation), which combines estimates of probability of events with
estimates on the utility of these events, is shown to be the optimal guide for decisions
under uncertainty.
These mathematical considerations were brought to a level of social science by SI-
MON [58] who introduced the notion of bounded rationality, emphasizing the fact that
actual people do not act as desired by normative decision theory. A further milestone
in the development of SEU-Theory were the studies of KAHNEMAN / TVERSKY
[26] resulting in prospect theory which shows the cognitive biases in real-world decision
behavior.
The subjective expected utility hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
Action =
n∑
j=1
U(cj(ai))P (cj(ai))→ maxi! (8.1)
This means that the action ai is chosen which maximizes the sum of subjective utilities U
defined on its consequences cj , weighted by the subjective probability P of this consequence
cj . In other words, the action is chosen which maximizes the average utility expected by
the acting individual.2
8.1.2 Adaptation
Now let me introduce adaptation as an argument which will allow me to compare the
theories of reinforcement learning and expected utility.
According to the [Encyclopedia Britannica], adaptation means “the process in which
an animal or plant becomes fitted to its environment”. Extrapolated to systems, this
definition will well serve my purposes, given I avoid the trap of biologism by introducing
modes of selection which are adequate to the nature of the process considered. A biolog-
ical mode of selection is by no means necessary for the application of evolutionary theory.3.
Back to the concept of adaptation, it most importantly implies that there exists a
certain criterion of optimality which should be approximated by a system while its
state is disturbed by the environment (compare BISCHOF [5] on whom much of this
2Results of formulae of this structure are called “expectations” in probability theory. The notion of
“expected utility” stems rather from this use of the word than from referring to subjective prospects, as
used by KAHNEMAN / TVERSKY [26].
3Here an example: I can act in my shared flat in a variety of ways with every action having a certain
potential probability to be repeated in the presence of my flatmates. Thus one may say that there exists
a certain fitness-function on my actions given my flatmates, ceteris paribus. But certainly my chances of
reproduction do not need to be mentioned if one analyzes this specific kind of evolutionary pressure. (Yet,
my provocations have not been this extreme...)
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argumentation is based). The existence of such a criterion of optimality is granted by
evolutionary theory, for the reason that certain values of certain attributes may raise or
lower a systems chance to exist in the future.
I will stop the considerations on evolution at this point since the question about
evolutionary functionality of certain attributes is exactly the question about self-
organization4 and functionality which I avoided in the [Emergence] section. It will for
now suffice to specify the criterion in the relevant context.
Returning to the question of modelling of individual level adaptation, I am now
able to state the following: A constructive hypothesis which models adaptive behavior
must necessarily combine elements representing assumptions on both
• on the optimal state of a system and
• the mechanism of its approximation given a particular environment.
8.1.3 Optimality and Reinforcement Learning
The behaviorist hypothesis of learning as invoked by HOMANS [22] [?] can be formulated
as follows:
A individual may be exposed to environmental stimuli as a result of showing a
particular behavior. These stimuli may either be experienced as rewarding or punishing
by that individual. If the stimuli are experienced as rewarding, the probability of
occurrence of the particular behavior will increase, which is called reinforcement. If
they are experienced as punishing, the probability will decrease, which is called extinction.
The proposal of representation of the optimal state is fulfilled (in this case implic-
itly) by the notions of reward and punishment. Both can be understood as measures
of the gradient5 of the individual state which may be a complex function of individual
behavior and environment. If the individual is punished, it descents the gradient away
form the optimal state; if it is rewarded, it ascents the gradient toward the optimal state.
The mechanism of approximation is the rather explicitly formulated process of re-
inforcement and extinction. It is easy to see that iteration of the process will drive the
individual to an area of its behavioral space where reward is maximized and punishment
is minimized, namely somewhere near the optimal state.6
4Whereby in the case of evolution the system level is the population level.
5An rough but rather intuitive description of the mathematical notion of “gradient” could be the change
of a state with respect to all its defining attributes.
6This procedure can be seen analogously to optimization by following the maximum gradient, together
with the associated problem of finding only local optima.
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8.1.4 Optimality and Expected Utility
The operation of subjective expected utility theory with regard to adaptation can be
viewed analogously to the case of reinforcement learning. The difference between both
theories consists in the fact that in the case of SEU there is the additional assumption of
representation of some features of the environment within the individual.
This representation of environment features is indirectly accomplished via the subjective
probability term of the SEU formula, since it states the feasibility of the respective actions.
Again, the optimal state is implicitly defined by a gradient-formulation, namely
those of utility. States of the environment (action consequences) with positive utility
push the individual up the gradient of the “well-being function”, environmental states
with negative utility push it down the gradient. Since the utilities are defined as being
subjective estimates, they might be seen as “within-individual” representations, as well.
Given certain correspondence of the intra-individual representations with their real-world
targets, iteratively maximizing the expected utility will finally result in approximating
the optimal state.7
8.1.5 Evaluation of the Theories
In comparison with reinforcement learning, the representation of experience by a explicit
set of subjective probabilities in SEU theory seems much more concise than summoning
a vague “history of reinforcements”. Needless to say that today one is not bound to
“scientific” formulation which omits latent variables and processes.
Summarized, SEU can be seen as the more explicit theory and shows more coher-
ence to “common sense” than reinforcement learning, besides the fact that is well tested
empirically. Therefore I decided to replace the Homans-Hypotheses by a SEU formulation
in my model, interpreting liking as a subjective assessment of utility and defining the
action to be considered as the choice of an interaction-partner.8
But nevertheless, the relative simplicity of the behaviorist approach (including HOMANS’
[Condensed Hypotheses]) is astonishing. Looking back, I would decide for the original
Homans-hypotheses if I had to do the project again, for the sake of comparability and
simplicity.
7It should make no sense to exaggerate the argument and talk about the “evolutionary advantage” of
representation of the environment. Such a discussion would make it necessary to model the actual system
in which evolution takes place.
8Certainly the decision was supported by important social factors: I wanted to do something modern.
And furthermore it pleased the sociologists and social-psychologists I am working with.
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8.2 Similarity and Attraction
By referring to “emission of feelings” [23]: p.181) or by invoking liking as “activity”,
namely the “reinforcer called social approval” [23]: p.181), HOMANS clearly highlights
the limitations of methodological behaviorism. The formulations are very clumsy and
contradictory to common sense, obviously in order to satisfy the demands of an obsolete
theory of knowledge. Luckily, neither KIRK and COLEMAN [29] nor TROITZSCH [66],
[67] are continuing these definitory acrobatics.
In order to bypass these problems and have a definition of liking which is both
psychologically sound and ready for easy operationalization, I employed BYRNE’s [8]
theory of attitude- similarity. In essence, BYRNE proposes that attitude-similarity is
the main determinant of interpersonal attraction, with the relationship between the two
variables being linear positive. According to BAMBERG9, this proposition has been
confirmed in numerous studies.
In effect, I employed the notion of attitude-similarity as a proxy for liking since I
did not incorporate factors to the model which could interfere with their relationship.
8.3 Feedback
In the original model of KIRK and COLEMAN the feedback-relation between liking and
interaction is realized by proposing two counterdirected effects connecting these variables
(see [Condensed Hypotheses]). The implementation proceeds analogously with explicit
representation of the hypotheses (compare section [The Kirk-Coleman-Model]).
Now for the case of SEU-theory, the introduction of feedback to the process could
have been accomplished as it is done implicitly by HOMANS’ reinforcement argumen-
tation. There he proposes that the change of attractivity is a function of the kind of
behavior, assumed that the individuals can interact in more than one way.10 This results
in mutual dependency of liking and interaction. Thus, feedback might to be said an
implicit attribute of the setup of the system of interaction, regardless of the kind of
adaptation-hypothesis employed.
Needless to say that I discovered this fact after already having implemented the
model. For sake of my reputation I have to emphasize that this account on feedback gets
lost in the projection from theory towards the [Condensed Hypotheses].
As a consequence, I modelled the feedback-process with the introduction of Social
9The information was given to me during a personal conversation. SEBASTIAN BAMBERG is a senior
lecturer of Social Psychology at the University of Giessen.
10This can be shown by the following passage: “...that every person evaluates some of the activities of
the others as valuable...” (“...dass jede Person einige Aktiviteaten der anderen Person wertvoll findet...”
[?]: p.155).
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Impact Theory, which replaced in alliance with SEU the two original hypotheses of the
Kirk-Coleman-model.
8.3.1 Social Impact Theory
LATANE’s [32] Social Impact Theory (SIT) is a rather concise theory determining the
impact of social influence on individual action and behavior. It is defined by the following
two equations. The first formulates the “principle of social forces”.
Imp = f(SIN) (8.2)
Where the social impact Imp is defined as a multiplicative function f of the strength S,
the immediacy I and the number N of sources of social influence.
The second equation formulates the “psychosocial law”:
Imp = sN t | 0 < t < 1 (8.3)
Where the social impact Imp is defined by a power function of the number N of sources
of social influence. Here s plays the role of a scaling constant, while the exponent t is
required to be in the interval of (0 : 1).
The equation has the following properties: it increases monotonous while its derivative
decreases monotonous, which results in decreasing marginal impact.11 Furthermore, if the
exponent t converges to 0, the function will approximate a constant function while it will
approximate a linear function if t converges to 1.
The name “psychosocial law” derives from the “psychophysical law” of STEVENS,
which employs the same formulation to relate objective and experienced intensity of
stimuli.
Social Impact Theory can be evaluated as a simple and well established phenomenological
account on social influence. (compare TANFORD / PENROSE [64]).
8.4 Agent Level Theory: Action and Social Influence
The integration of both Subjective Expected Utility and Social Impact Theory is accom-
plished by invoking the previously introduced considerations on employment of attitude-
similarity as a proxy for liking, resp. utility. This allows for attitudes being the basis for
decisions on interaction and then being interaction being the basis for changes in attitudes:
SEU: Attitude-Similarity → Interaction
11This means that the more sources of influence are present, the less difference makes the appearance of
a additional source.
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SIT: Interaction → Attitude-Similarity
This is the general theoretical setup of the Modified Kirk-Coleman-Model on the
psychological- resp. agent-level.
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Chapter 9
Declaration of the Modified Model
In this section I want to formally declare the Modified Kirk-Coleman-Model. For this I
will use the theoretical results gained in the previous section, as well as the modelling
procedure defined in the section [Probabilistic System Model]. The final aim is rep-
resentation of the models theoretical assumptions in terms of a dynamic bayesian network.
Detailed description of the models implementation employing MATLAB Bayes Net
Toolbox will be given in the respective appendix.
9.1 System Representation
The Modified Kirk-Coleman-Model is characterized by representing interaction behavior
between three agents. Therefore a first system representation on the social level (as
introduced in the [System] section) could be the following1:
Spot = 〈{A1,A2,A3}, I ⊆ {I12, I13, I21, I23, I31, I32}, ∅〉 (9.1)
Here Ai denotes the Agents (the composition-set) and I their (bonding-) set of realized
interactions (excluding interactions with themselves)2 while the environment is defined as
empty. One should note that the set of realized interactions I is a central explanandum
of the model and therefore unknown. The system is denoted Spot , a potential system,
because of this.
Since the Agents are defined by SEU and SIT, they can be said to be systems
themselves, consisting of the variables defined by the respective theories. Thus the models
system representation needs to proceed on a lower agent-level.
In the last section I defined utility being equal with liking which was again defined
by difference in attitudes, an agent Ai’s composition CAi may be defined the following
way:
1For now, I will ignore the aspect of time.
2The indices of interactions signify the respective source- and target-agents.
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CAi = {Action,Attitude, Trust} (9.2)
The definition of the agents composition CAi becomes clear after looking at their respective
bonding sets BAi, which are defined by the two agent-level theories and an auxiliary theory
of trust which models the expectation-component of subjective expected utility theory.
BAi = {(SEU : ∆Attitudeij , T rusti → Actioni), (9.3)
(SIT : Attitudeall, Actionall → Attitudei), (9.4)
(AUX : Actionj , T rustji → Trustji)} (9.5)
This means in words that, according to SEU-theory, agent Ai’s choice of an interaction
partner Actioni depends on both the difference in attitude ∆Attitudeij between Agent
Ai and the potential partner Aj (representing utility) and on his state of trust Trusti
(representing prospect).
Ai’s Attitudei is, according to SIT, dependent on the Attitudeall of the other Agents,
given they have interacted with Ai as signified by their actions Actionall.
The auxiliary theory defines Ai’s state of trust Trustji upon agent Aj ’s willingness
to engage in interaction with himself as being dependent from its previous state Trustji3
and the other agents interactions Actionj . (I will assume a variable of trust for every
possible interaction.)
I will end the tiring explanation of the formulas by completing the definition of
agents, accounting for the fact that they form their mutual environment. Invoking
above definitions on composition and bonding-sets of agents together with the mutual
environment consideration, an agent can be defined the following:
Ai = 〈CAi, BAi, (Aj ,Ak)〉 (9.6)
Finally, the connection of the two levels is achieved by defining the equivalence of inter-
action Iij and Actioni:
Iij ≡ Actioni (9.7)
The two above definitions can be seen as bridge hypotheses (compare [Level Tran-
sition]and [Semantics and Bridge Hypotheses), because they are relating agent and
social level. Nevertheless, there there will be the need for additional bridge hypotheses,
translating configurations of individual actions into properties of the system of interaction.
Returning to model-declaration, inserting the agent definition into the social level
3Time is not introduced explicitly yet.
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composition, given by the first term of equation (33), completes the definition of the
models qualitative system representation:
S = 〈〈CA1, BA1, (A2,A3)〉, 〈CA2, BA2, (A1,A3)〉, 〈CA3, BA3, (A1,A2)〉〉 (9.8)
As we can see, the system exposes an obviously different structure on agent-level than on
social level, namely because interactions are not explicitly specified as bonding relations
but as components of the agents.4 However, I will soon restore proper social level
representation.
Since equation (39) contains all bonding relations on the lowest level of definition,
it constrains the system in a way that allows for deduction of interactions, given specific
functional definitions and starting values.
In conclusion: Specific instances of S allow for deduction of actual realizations of
the potential system Spot on social level.
9.2 Transition Graph
I will proceed by defining the transition representation of the Modified Kirk-Coleman-
Model (see [Unfolding and Transition Representation]) and thus introduce time into the
model.
Sts(t,t+1) = 〈Cts(t,t+1), Ets(t,t+1),Bts(t,t+1)〉 (9.9)
Its familiar look (as compared to equation (40)) is restored by separating composition and
bonding sets.
Cts(t,t+1) = {CA1t, CA2t, CA3t, CA1t+1, CA2t+1, CA3t+1} (9.10)
Bts(t,t+1) = {BA1unfolded, BA2unfolded, BA2unfolded} (9.11)
Ets(t,t+1) = {∅} (9.12)
In transition representation Sts(t,t+1), the composition set is “duplicated” (as long it does
not change), in order to represent the objects in time explicitly. The unfolded bonding
sets now contain relations between the objects which originate in the domain of t and end
in t+ 1.
4One should furthermore note that the environment E of the system S is still empty, regardless of
the property that the agents form their mutual environment: The list of remaining agents A within the
particular agent (CAi, BAi, (Aj ,Ak)) can be interpreted as recursive pointer to their respective definitions.
In fact, this represents properties of the bonding set, not the environment set.
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Graphical representation follows naturally from above considerations: for the rea-
son that the environment set Ets(t,t+1) is empty, its merging with the composition set
Cts(t,t+1) (as proposed in [Transition Graph]) is unnecessary. The latter combined with the
(still qualitatively defined) transition bonding Bts(t,t+1) readily defines a directed acyclic
transition graph5 DAGts(t,t+1), the backbone of dynamic bayesian network representation:
DAGts(t,t+1) = 〈Cts(t,t+1),Bts(t,t+1)〉 (9.13)
In order to have a look at the actual transition graph, one now needs to explicate its
sets. Nevertheless, the bonding set is to rich to understand the graph as a whole easily.
Therefore I will decompose it into the respective parentship subgraphs.
9.2.1 Demonstration of Parentship Subgraphs
The parentship subgraphs are oriented on the theories employed in the model. This
allows to interpret the graphs as templates since they exist three times, once for every
agent. The agents are indexed i, j, k with i denoting the respective ego and j and k the
respective alteres.
The illustration [Figure 9.1] shows the subjective expected utility theory template
subgraph DAGts(t,t+1)SEU,i (compare equations (30),(35) and section on [Subjective
Expected Utility Theory]): It incorporates all attitude variables in order to allow
Attitude i, t Attitude j, t Attitude k, t Trust j-i, t Trust k-i, t
Action i, t+1
Figure 9.1: Parentship Subgraph of SEU-Template
computation of differences in attitudes (aka. utility or liking) as well as trust assigned to
the willingness for interaction of the remaining agents, modelling expectation.
The second template subgraph DAGts(t,t+1)SIT,i, as displayed in [Figure 9.2], corre-
spondents to the assumptions of social impact theory (compare equation (36) and
section on [Social Impact Theory]): The variables contained in this subgraph allow for
determination of number and strength of social influence, with the latter defined via
differences in attitudes and thus liking.
5Acyclicity is granted by introduction of time.
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Attitude i, t Attitude j, t Attitude k, t Action j, t Action k, t
Attitude i, t+1
Figure 9.2: Parentship Subgraph of SIT-Template
The last template subgraph DAGts(t,t+1)TRU,i is the one assigned to the auxiliary
theory of trust (compare equation (37)), which is displayed in [Figure 9.3] and will soon
be explained in detail: This subgraph expresses the dependency of current trust on
Action j, t Trust j-i, t
Trust j-i, t+1
Figure 9.3: Parentship Subgraph of Trust-Template
previous trust and action of the trusted.
As stated, the transition graph DAGts(t,t+1) is the union of the template subgraphs for
all agents.
DAGts(t,t+1)A,i = DAGts(t,t+1)SEU,i ∪ DAGts(t,t+1)SIT,i ∪ DAGts(t,t+1)TRU,i (9.14)
DAGts(t,t+1) = DAGts(t,t+1)A,1 ∪ DAGts(t,t+1)A,2 ∪ DAGts(t,t+1)A,3 (9.15)
Equation (46) shows the aggregation of an individual agent transition subgraph from the
theoretic template subgraphs, while equation (47) shows the aggregation of the systems
transition graph from the individual agent subgraphs.
Finally, with [Figure 9.4], I also provide an illustration on the complete transition
graph DAGts(t,t+1) which might look a little complicated compared to the previous
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illustrations:6
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Figure 9.4: Complete Transition Graph
The top line of nodes represents the systems composition at time t, while the bottom
line represents it at time t + 1. The first three nodes in a line represent the action
variables of the respective agents (indexed i = {1, 2, 3}), the following six the trust
variables for every possible interaction (indexed ij = {12, 13, 21, 23, 31, 32} ) while the last
three nodes in a line represent the agents attitude variables (indexed i = {1, 2, 3}). As
mentioned, the transition graph is the union of all theoretic template graphs for all agents.
The definition of the structure of dependency in time is gained by unrolling the
transition graph according to [Representation in Time: Temporal Graph]. This is
accomplished automatically by the employed software. For the moment, the structure of
the Modified Kirk Coleman-Model is readily defined.
6I used some automated software included in Matlab BNT to create the graph (I usually prefer Visone),
so please excuse the absence of labels. Drawing graphs and outputting them in vector graphics is more
complicated than it looks.
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9.3 Functional Dependencies: Conditional Probability Ta-
bles
What still lacks in order to complete the model-declaration is the definition of the
functional dependencies defined on the nodes of the transition graph. In other words: the
formal implementation of the theories constituting the bonding set, as stated in section
[System Representation], needs to be accomplished.
As introduced in [A Sketch of Bayesian Networks], I will use the bayesian network
formalism for this. In order to achieve a bayesian network representation, the the already
defined transition graph needs to be backed up with conditional probability functions
representing the mentioned theoretic assumptions. Since those theories are defined on a
domain represented by the template transition subgraphs introduced in the last section,
I will attach the conditional probability functions on them.
Intended for my own convenience, I assumed discrete variables and thus tables as
conditional probability functions.7. The tables are defined on variables with the following
domains:
Actioni ∈ {1, 2} (9.16)
Attitudei ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} (9.17)
Trusti ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (9.18)
The selection of domains is somewhat arbitrary, besides the proposal that the two latter
should represent ordinal information. Attitude is represented by seven values since this is
a usual size of Likert-attitude scales.
In the following section I will discuss the constraints laid on those conditional proba-
bility tables (CPD’s) by the model-formulations of the respective theories.
9.3.1 Subjective Expected Utility Theory
As can be seen in the first illustration in [Demonstration of Parentship Subgraphs] and
equation (35), the structure of probabilistic formulation of the subjective expected utility
assumption within the modified Kirk-Coleman-model is the following:
P (Actioni,t+1) =
P (Actioni,t+1|Attitudei,t, Attitudej,t, Attitudek,t, T rustji,t, T rustki,t) (9.19)
Formulation of agent i’s utility Uij of interaction with agent j is given by the following
equation:
7It was intended for my convenience, but the decision did not pay out. Now I have got firmer knowledge
regarding modelling with theoretical probability distributions and clearly see the work and complicatedness
I could easily have avoided. More on this later.
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Uij = 56 +
1
6
(1− |Attitudei −Attitudej |) (9.20)
This equation yields a definition of utility as being linearly decreasing with difference in
attitudes and being normalized to the interval (1 : 0) for the defined domain of Attitude.
Equality in attitudes results in an utility of 1 and maximum difference in an utility of 0.
Expected utility EU ij of the interaction is given by multiplication of utility Uij
with the respective value of trust Trustji in j’s willingness to return the favor of
interaction:
EU ij = Uij Trustji (9.21)
This results in the possibility of an ordering of desirability of interaction choices.
Since deterministic maximization can not be modelled within an probabilistic framework,
the agents are defined to choose interaction partners with a probability equal to their
respective share of expected utility compared to the utility totally available at that time:
P (Actioni,t+1 = j) =
EU ij∑n
j=1 EU ij
|i 6= j (9.22)
Applying equation (54) to every possible configuration of its exogenous variables yields the
desired conditional probability table attached to the SEU-template parentship subgraph.
It should be mentioned that it is large, namely 5488*2 cells.
9.3.2 Social Impact Theory
The structure of probabilistic dependency of the implementation of social impact theory
(as introduced in [Demonstration of Parentship Subgraphs] and equation (36)) is the
following:
P (Attitudei,t+1) =
P (Attitudei,t+1|Attitudei,t, Attitudej,t, Attitudek,t, Actionj,t, Actionk,t) (9.23)
The implementation of social impact theory is somewhat more complicated than of SEU-
theory. First, social impact is divided into three classes of influence, representing the
behavioral alternatives of the agent: influence towards a more negative (smaller) attitude
value SIneg, influence towards perpetuation of the current attitude value SIperp and
finally towards a more positive (bigger) attitude value SIpos. The particular impact for
the respective class m is calculated according to following formula:
SIm = U¯agents∈m sN(m)r | 0 < r < 1 (9.24)
This equation defines social impact SIm for the classes via the power function defined
on the number of agents in the respective class m, as proposed by the “psychosocial law”,
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weighted by the mean utility U¯agents∈m of the agents in this class. The term s is a scaling
constant, while the exponent r is required to be in the interval of (0:1) (compare section
on [Social Impact Theory]).
It should be noted that the power function is not defined directly on the number
of agents in the respective class nm, but rather on a function of this number:
N(m) = nm | m = neg ∩m = pos (9.25)
N(m) = nm + 1 q | m = perp (9.26)
For the case of influence towards change of attitude, the number of agents in the respec-
tive class enters the social influence equation (56), while for the case of perpetuation
of attitude the number of agents in the class is incremented by one, accounting for the
own attitude. The increment is furthermore multiplied by q, a factor representing the
ego-agents resistance towards social influence. The higher q gets, the more important is
the own attitude compared to the others.
The probability of obedience to a particular impact class P (OBAm) is given by its
proportion relative to the total amount of impact:
P (OBAm) = OBAmOBAneg +OBAperp +OBApos (9.27)
Since a more positive or negative attitude may be defined on more than one attitude value,
the mass of the probability of change P (OBAm) may be required to be spread over those
values. The assumption that the probability of attitude change is linearly decreasing with
its size is expressed by the following equation:
P (Attitudei = x) = P (OBAm) (1− |x−marginm|∑X
o=1 |o−marginm|
) | x ∈ m (9.28)
The probability of showing a particular attitude-value x is defined by weighting the
probability of obedience to a certain class of impact P (OBAm) by the inverse of its share
of the total distances towards the outer margin value of the particular category.
9.3.3 Auxiliary Assumptions on Trust
The structure of probabilistic dependency of the assumptions on trust, as defined in equa-
tion (37) and the last template subgraph in section [Demonstration of Parentship Sub-
graphs], is the following:
P (Trustji,t+1) =
P (Trustji,t+1|Trustji,t, Actionj,t) (9.29)
The idea is simply that trust in ones willingness to interact is increased if an interaction
occurs, while it is lowered when there is no interaction. In order to achieve probabilistic
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formulation I assume a certain probability p of erroneous change of the value of trust.
Again I assume small deviances to be more probable than large ones:
P (Trustji = x) = (1− p) e−α |x−true| (9.30)
For application of the equation α needs to be determined. The following solutions were
calculated using MAPLE, accounting for the fact that probabilities must sum to one:
α = 1.60289 | true ∈ margin (9.31)
α = 2.13678 | true /∈ margin (9.32)
There exist two different solutions for the cases that the true value is on the margin of
the domain of Trust or not, resp. for a “sloped” and a “peaked” distribution.
Above equations result in a probability distribution of trust which assigns a proba-
bility 1 − p to the true value while the probabilities of realizing a different value are
exponentially8 decreasing with the size of this respective difference.
I should note that the implementations of the three theories share a common at-
tribute, namely that events with zero probability are assigned a new probability, only
slightly greater than zero. This way I tried to allow for all defined events to be possible.
This concludes the declaration of the Modified Kirk-Coleman-Model. Finally, it is
far more complicated than the original, which was not really intended.
8If you compare this approach to the similar problem occurring in the implementation of SIT, you my
wonder why I used both linear and exponential approaches. The honest answer is that these are ad hoc
modelling solutions. In this case I was not able do guarantee positive probabilities by a linear approach and
the
∑X
i=1
pi = 1 constraint. Therefore I used an exponential equation, although Ockhams Razor would
have requested a linear one.
Chapter 10
Model Sensitivity
During this section I will give a description of the results of the model. Please excuse
me if the interpretation of the results is not too detailed, I just wanted to show that my
philosophical convictions can be coded in a working method. This is, what the modified
Kirk-Coleman model does.
10.1 Employed Soft- and Hardware
The model has been implemented employing MURPHY’s [40] Bayes Net Toolbox for
MATLAB. (BNT) BNT is a GPL licensed library of MATLAB functions for learning and
inference in bayesian networks, while MATLAB is a very widespread software package
for scientific and technical computing. I first experimented with readily compiled and
comfortable software like NETICA and GENIE, but these proved to be unhandy for
implementation of dynamic bayesian networks. On the other hand I did not want to
write my implementation from scratch in a general language like C++, so the use of
a sophisticated library in an interpreted language like MATLAB looked promising. A
further advantage were its graphics features.
The calculations were executed on a computer with AMD Athlon XP-2500 proces-
sor and 512MB RAM running Windows XP operating system. A monte carlo parameter
study of the model, running 100 times 100 time-steps took approximately seven hours of
processor time.
This fact implies that it would have been a better choice to separate simulation
and analysis of the model by means of probabilistic inference. This could have been
accomplished by implementing the model employing standard multi agent based
methodology and rather use bayesian networks on top of model -generated data.
55
56 CHAPTER 10. MODEL SENSITIVITY
10.2 Solving the Model
Because of the size of the model (12 times t variables) and its temporal structure1, the
application of exact algorithms for inference in bayesian networks has shown as being
infeasible. After some bad experiences I finally arrived at Likelihood Weighting as an
appropriate algorithm. I will give an introduction to it after a short summary of the trials.
For the case of the very popular Junction Tree Algorithm the software crashed at
a model size of t ≈ 20, exceeding an amount of 2GB central memory. Application of the
so called Boyen-Koller-Algorithm, which is specially designed for approximate inference
in temporal models, resulted in out-of-memory crashes at t ≈ 60.
Experimentation with MATLAB BNT’s implementation of Gibbs- Sampling, a sim-
ulation algorithm which is todays silver bullet for probabilistic inference (see GILKS
et.al. [17]), yielded results for t > 100, but those were obviously flawed. The inferred
distributions showed a strange pattern of entropy, switching between deterministic and
uniform.2
10.2.1 Stochastic Sampling
Likelihood Weighting proved itself as a feasible approach. Being a sampling algorithm, it
avoids computation with the actual rules of probability calculus but rather simulates the
“random-experiments” which are modelled by it. Thus the concept of Joint Probability
Distribution is not needed for computation, resulting in a minimal need for computer
memory.
In order to introduce the algorithm I need to provide a glance at the common
problems associated with stochastic sampling. I will start with the introduction of
the most common method called Rejection Sampling (compare PRESS et.al. [48]).
An example will demonstrate the procedure: If we want to sample a distribution say
P (X) with P (Xi = x1) = 0.2 and P (Xi = x2) = 0.8 we will employ a pseudo random
generator which produces uniformly distributed sample values si in the interval (0 : 1).
If si is < 0.2 we will assign a realization of x1 to it, if si is > 0.2 we will say that
x2 has been realized. This procedure is repeated until the counts of the sample values
approximate the probability distribution P (X) with desired accuracy.
The problematic issue is now that if the probability of a particular value of the
distribution gets sufficiently small, we will have to wait a long time until a sample value
realizes this value. And we will have to wait a accordingly longer in order to get a sufficient
1I will not discuss this problem here. The reader is referred to JENSEN’s [25] treatment of the topic.
2A better software implementing Gibbs Sampling and other MCMC-algorithms is WinBUGS. Its de-
signed for bayesian inference in graphical models, a method which extends this treatment of bayesian
networks by the incorporation of knowledge known prior to data. Unfortunately, I discovered this software
only after having finished my computations on the modified Kirk-Coleman-model.
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number of samples realizing this particular value. For example, if P (Xi = xj) is 0.001 we
will have to expect to draw thousand samples in order to get a single realization xj and a
million samples to get thousand counts of this specific value. One would have produced
thousand times more samples than we wanted to.
In bayesian networks this problem has special significance since a sampling sweep
through the net requires repeated sampling from multiple conditional distributions. This
means that whole configurations of values of parent variables have to be hit by the
sampler in order to allow for realization of a certain value of the child variable.
Now Likelihood Weighting is an approach to avoid the problem of improbability
caused by multiple and nested conditions, as coded in the graphical structure of the
model. The idea is not to wait until some improbable conditional sample is drawn,
but instead to sample from an unconditional distribution and then weight the sample
with the probability of its conditions, resp its parent distributions. This allows for
significantly accelerated computation. A short description of the algorithm can be found
at RIEDMILLER [49].
For completeness I should mention another, more powerful, approach, namely Markov-
Chain-Monte-Carlo or MCMC, of which the mentioned Gibbs-Sampling is a special
case: here a markov-chain is specified in a way that ensures that its stationary limiting
distribution is equivalent to the distribution one wants to sample. The power of the
method consists in the fact that no redundant samples are produced. It extends the
advantages of likelihood weighting by the possibility to cope with improbabilities which do
not stem from the structure of the bayesian network. Needless to say MCMC incorporates
very sophisticated mathematics. Introduction can be found in GILKS et al. [17].
10.3 Monte-Carlo Parameter Study
In order get a proper idea of the models behavior I undertook a monte carlo parameter
study of the model. The following parameters were instantiated with uniform random
values:
• Initial values of the systems variables Ct;
• Individual agents social impact theory parameters {qi, ri} as previously introduced;
• Individual agents probabilities pi of erroneous change of the value of Trusti;
One hundred monte-carlo runs of the model over 100 time-steps3 were calculated with
the result that the model converged towards joint uniform distribution under all instanti-
ated conditions. I will present some illustrations to clarify this result.
3The number of steps was this low due to the massive amount of computations needed. Since the
process always converged within less than half of the steps this should not be considered as a problem.
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10.3.1 Illustrations of the Monte-Carlo-Runs
Some introduction will be helpful for interpretation. The graphs show attributes of indi-
vidual systems variables plotted against time. The first half of the plots shows the change
of the variables expectation µ(v) while the second half shows its change of entropy H(v).
The latter can be interpreted as a measure of dispersion (besides the fact that it is one
of the cental theoretical notions of information theory). An entropy of 0 signifies no dis-
persion at all, while a maximum value signifies uniform distribution. I abstained from
calculating standardized measures since all distributions converge to uniform and thus
maximum entropy. The respective maximum values Hmax(v) are:
Hmax(Action) = 1
Hmax(Trust) = 2
Hmax(Attitude) = 2.807
[Figures 10.1 and 10.2] show the dynamics of agent A1’s interaction choice Action1.
As can be seen, the expectation and entropy rapidly converge towards indifference4, resp.
maximum entropy which are functions of uniform distribution.
The same is true for the agents attitudes and trusts, where expectations converge
towards indifference and entropies towards maximum. Subsequently, two exemplary
characteristics of agent A1, namely Attitude1 ([Figures 10.3 and 10.4]) and Trust12
([Figures 10.5 and 10.6]) are displayed. Please note that I am only showing illustrations
for the first of the three agents, because the remaining ones look indistinguishable from
these. (Compare [Appendixes] for complete results.)
10.3.2 Cluster-Analysis of the Monte-Carlo-Runs
A k-means cluster-analysis performed on the complete set of variables and runs supports
the conclusion of convergence towards joint uniform distribution. According to its results
it does not make sense to assume a partitioning of model runs. This is implicated by
the low and rather constant characteristic of the Scree-plots of Mean-Silhouette- ([Figure
10.7]) and Gain-in-R2-Values ([Figure 10.8]).
Silhouette-Values are coefficients in the range of (−1 : 1), where -1 signifies a
probably mistaken cluster-assignment of a single data entry (run). Accordingly, a value
of 0 signifies an assignment to more than one cluster and a value of 1 a probably correct
assignment. Gain-in-R2 denotes the increase of explained variance over the data entries
compared to a (k-1)-cluster solution and is sometimes called Eta-coefficient (compare
BACHER [2]).
4Actioni has a domain of 1, 2, where a higher value corresponds to an agent with a higher index. Thus
an expectation of 1.5 implies indifference. Compare [Functional Dependencies: Conditional Probability
Tables] .
10.3. MONTE-CARLO PARAMETER STUDY 59
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
t
µ(A
1)
Expectation µ(A1) of Action of Agent 1 against Time t 
Figure 10.1: Expectation of Monte-Carlo runs of interaction choice Action1 of agent A1
against time.
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Figure 10.2: Entropy of Monte-Carlo runs of interaction choice Action1 of agentA1 against
time.
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Figure 10.3: Expectation of Monte-Carlo runs of attitude Attitude1 of agent A1 against
time.
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Figure 10.4: Entropy of Monte-Carlo runs of attitude Attitude1 of agent A1 against time.
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Figure 10.5: Expectation of Monte-Carlo runs of Trust Trust1−2 of agent A1 against time.
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Figure 10.6: Entropy of Monte-Carlo runs of Trust Trust1−2 of agent A1 against time.
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Figure 10.7: K-Means-Clustering of MC-parameter study results: Plot shows mean
silhouette-values for k-cluster solution.
10.4 Interpretation of the Results
Intuitively, the results seem to be predictable from both employed theories and complete
structure of possible interactions. Combination of Subjective Expected Utility - and
Social Impact Theory implies an opportunistic view on actors: not only decisions but
also preferences are flexible towards environmental conditions. Given homogeneous
restrictions over the agents, what else than increasing similarity in attributes and thus
mutual equality of opportunities could emerge from these theories?
Admittedly, this result is trivial and could have been easily predicted from the
models assumptions with out employing complicated mathematical apparatus. As men-
tioned before, the choice of the Kirk-Coleman model has been a compromise. Certainly
one is free to implement models which actually exploit the advantages of bayesian networks.
Maybe a more interesting (and realistic) result could be realized with a heteroge-
nous structure of interaction. Nevertheless, this is beyond the scope of this particular
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Figure 10.8: K-Means-Clustering of MC-parameter study results: Plot shows gain in R2
for k-cluster solution as compared to (k − 1)-cluster solution.
work.5
10.4.1 Comparison to the Original Model
KIRK and COLEMAN stated in their article ([29]: p.189) that the stochastic simulation
model produced a wide array of patterns, among them the isolated-pair-configuration as
proposed by SIMMEL.
Nevertheless, a view on their tables of simulation results shows a tendency towards
lowering the differences between individual participation of interaction. This is always
the case expect for extreme situations where one agent is forbidden to take initiative or
initial liking-values differed by the magnitude of 100. TROITZSCH ([66]: p.222) reports
for his implementation that asymmetries in interaction behavior seem to be dependant
on initial values of the simulation. This is also reported by KIRK and COLEMAN ([29]:
p.189) for their microscopic differential equation system implementation.
5TROITZSCH [66] [67] has experimented with sets of more of three agents and inhomogeneous struc-
tures of possible interactions. There exists a variety of possible realizations of the process, but there is no
systematic review of the runs known, at least to me.
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Sadly, KIRK and COLEMAN undertook no systematic parameter study and fur-
thermore calculated maximally only 1000 iterations of the simulation. I assume that in
the case of the modified model convergence has been accelerated by the more powerful
feedback mechanism of Social Impact Theory as compared to the “reward” of interaction
in the original model. For the case of extreme initial conditions the SIT feedback
mechanism may have enabled convergence towards joint uniform distribution.
I finally arrived at the conclusion that the models behaviors do only differ with
respect to the strength of the feedback modifying agents preferences and that the
SIMMEL-hypothesis cannot usually be realized by assumption of opportunistic actors,
given homogeneous restrictions on their possible actions. Exceptional realization may
be enabled by initial conditions which exceed the impact of the particular feedback
mechanism on the agents preferences.
Chapter 11
Level-Transition Instantiated
As promised in the [Introduction] and the section [Level Transition], I will finally show an
implementation of an actual level-transitory explanation in order to prove the feasibility
of both proposed methodology and method. Again, it should be understood rather as an
demonstration than as a detailed analysis of the model.
In principle, the employed procedure (compare section on [Level Transition]) con-
sists of the following operations:
• Definition of Bridge Hypotheses which translate properties on both levels;
• Performance of inference on the lower level: either exhausting the set of realizations
of higher level properties or sampling it;
• Aggregation of the results of lower-level inference over the functions defined by Bridge
Hypotheses, thus completing level transitory explanation;
This structure will organize the arrangement of the ongoing section. I will start by intro-
ducing the theoretical circumstances of the example.
11.1 Bridge Hypothesis: Balance Theory Classification
Theoretical background of the example is HEIDER’s [19] Theory of Structural Balance
which will deliver the bridge hypothesis to be considered. Balance Theory can be de-
scribed as being similar to FESTINGER’s Theory of Cognitive Dissonance and analyzes
social situations with respect to the occurrence of dissonance. It should be mentioned
that Balance Theory is not connected to the employed agent level theories. Nevertheless
it allows a good exemplification of the method. I will now briefly describe its basic
assumptions.
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11.1.1 Balance Theory
HEIDER considers a undirected triad as an abstract scenario for Balance Theory, which is
denoted P-O-X-triple: P stands for a person, O for a second one and X for some particular
P-Person O-Other
X-Issue
Figure 11.1: The P-O-X Triple.
issue or object, which can certainly be some third person1. In this case edges of the graphs
represent mutual symmetric evaluations Evali,j between two elements of the triad i, j
and are defined to be either positive or negative. Negative evaluations Evali,j = (−) will
eventually be designated by 0 and positive evaluations Evali,j = (+) by 1 in illustrations 2.
The core assumption of Balance Theory is now that there are configurations of
evaluations which provoke cognitive dissonance. These are namely those in which a) the
evaluations of two persons disagree while their mutual evaluation is positive and b) in
which their evaluations agree while their mutual evaluation is negative. The situations
which are provoking cognitive dissonance are called unbalanced, while the remaining are
called balanced. Since cognitive dissonance implies a persons activity to eliminate it,
unbalanced states are considered immanently unstable by HEIDER.
In the case of X being a person, the triad becomes symmetric, as mentioned. This leads
to the possibility of modelling structural balance in analogy to multiplication of signs
(compare WASSERMAN / FAUST [68]). An easy to remember example for this is the
saying “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. The overall sign of a triad is computed
the following way:
(+) ∗ (+) = (+) (11.1)
(−) ∗ (−) = (+) (11.2)
(+) ∗ (−) = (−) (11.3)
This can be generalized to the proposal that uneven numbers of negative signs (evalua-
tions) result in a negative sign of the triad.
1A memory hook for my indication of the elements of the P-O-X triple is: It begins with P in the upper
left and proceeds clockwise.
2This is because the employed software for drawing graphs, VISONE, does not support treatment of
signed graphs.
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Now, negatively signed triads are defined as unbalanced while positively signed tri-
ads are defined as balanced. The following illustrations shows the possible configurations
of the P-O-X triple with 0 representing (-) and 1 representing (+):
1
1
1 0
1
0
0
1 0 0
0
1
POX 1 POX 2 POX 3 POX 4
Figure 11.2: Balanced Triads, (0 ≡ −, 1 ≡ +)
1
0
1 0
1
1
1
1 0 0
0
0
POX 5 POX 6 POX 7 POX 8
Figure 11.3: Unbalanced Triads, (0 ≡ −, 1 ≡ +)
It can easily be seen that the upper half of the eight possible P-O-X configurations is
balanced because its even number of zeros, while the lower four are unbalanced due to the
uneven number of zeros.
11.1.2 Assignment of Model-Realizations to P-O-X Triples
The core bridge hypothesis applied to the modified Kirk-Coleman model consists in map-
ping relations of agent variables on the set of P-O-X triples, resp. their balance-classes.
This is achieved by application of the following criterion:
|Attitudei −Attitudej | < 3 7→ Evali,j = (+) (11.4)
|Attitudei −Attitudej | ≥ 3 7→ Evali,j = (−) (11.5)
By application of above formulae, an evaluation Evali,j is assigned to every two-digit
difference-relation of attitudes |Attitudei − Attitudej |. This efficiently enables for
assignment of the 343 attitude-configurations to the eight P-O-X triple classes, which can
be further aggregated towards classes of balance and unbalance.
I should add that the criterion value of three is chosen completely arbitrary, since
there is no concrete attitude object defined. Thus the attitude values lack a specific
meaning. Furthermore the bridge hypothesis is quite uninformative, as proposed in the
section [Bridge Hypotheses and Violation of Object Identity].
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11.2 Aggregated Results of Lower Level Inference
The task of the computations was an arbitrarily chosen question for which interaction
partner agent two would decide in the next step, given a specific P-O-X triple or balance
state was instantiated.
As proposed at the beginning of the section, inference on the lower level was car-
ried out, namely in an exhaustive manner for all 343 possible configurations. Thus the
individual quantity to be computed via the Bayes Net was
P (Action2,t+1 = x|Attitude1,t = w,Attitude2,t = y,Attitude3,t = z) (11.6)
with w, x, y, z being configurations of values from the domains of the respective variables3
For expression of the findings in balance theory notation I assumed agent 1 to be P ,
agent 2 to be O and agent 3 to be X.
After lower-level computation the results were aggregated over the P-O-X- and
Balance-classes according to their respective definitions and the bridge-hypotheses of
equation 68 and equation 69.
Mean probabilities of O’s (resp. 2’s) interaction choices Pµ(ActionO = i), given a
realization of a particular class in the previous step are shown in the subsequent table.
Additionally, the appropriate standard deviations over the element distributions are
displayed:
Class Pµ(ActionO = P ) Pµ(ActionO = X) SDPµ(ActionO)
P-O-X 1 0.5000 0.5000 0.0490
P-O-X 2 0.7273 0.2727 0.1080
P-O-X 3 0.5000 0.5000 0.2031
P-O-X 4 0.2727 0.7273 0.1080
P-O-X 5 0.3954 0.6046 0.0344
P-O-X 6 0.5000 0.5000 0.0421
P-O-X 7 0.6046 0.3954 0.0344
P-O-X 8 0.5000 0.5000 0.3674
Balanced 0.5000 0.5000 0.1887
Unbalanced 0.5000 0.5000 0.0714
The interpretation of the table is quite straightforward. Since definition of membership
to a particular P-O-X triple is dependent on configurations of attitudes and thus utility,
the mean probability distributions express differences in opportunities for agent O (resp.
2) over the particular classes.
3These calculations called for 21 seconds of processor time. The amount of time is comparably low
because of the minimal time-window considered.
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In cases where the distribution is fifty/fifty the agents P and X are in average
simply equally attractive. If a probability is greater than 0.5, this can be seen as a result
of asymmetric attractiveness corresponding to the definition of the respective P-O-X
triple. A further indicator for this is the symmetry over the asymmetric distributions
within a single balance-class: the probabilities are simply twisted (compare P-O-X
2/P-O-X 4 and P-O-X 5/P-O-X 7, remembering that agent O is in the upper right
corner). Differing probabilities over the triples of the two balance-classes are results of
the asymmetric criterion value of three defined in equation 68 and equation 69.
Varying precision of aggregate predictions as given by the standard deviations
SDPµ(ActionO) cannot be so easily explained: detailed examination of the lower
level realizations should be necessary.
This should finish the treatment of the actual implementation of level transitory
explanation. A description of impact of macroscopic states to individual action has been
achieved.
In the end, the actual process of computation might not seem too different from
what one would expect after being reminded of the Coleman-micro-macro scheme.
Nevertheless, the problem consisted in proposing a method, which avoids mistakes. And
there are truly enough opportunities for making mistakes with this particular question,
especially at concept formation. The fact that the actual procedure seems trivial is a
great relief for me. The good ideas are always trivial with respect to something. Lets
hope that this is true for this work, too!
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Chapter 12
Conclusion
At last I want to summarize the problems and solutions faced during the course of this
work and furthermore give an outlook towards future research.
12.1 Summary: Problems and Solutions
The basic problem faced in an account on level-transitory explanation and thus emergence
is the identification of an appropriate criterion of object identity. This has been found
in the definition of objects by the set of causal mechanisms attached to these. As
being dependent on the conceivability of manipulation causality provides a criterion
which assures object identity on all levels considered. Some might be disappointed by
this subjectivist approach, but I guess that proposition of restricted independence of
object and observer is the only firm ground reachable during discussion of this matter.
Furthermore the employed philosophical approach allowed for well founded criticism of
methodology of both methodological individualism and bridge hypotheses.
For implementation of a proposed methodology of lower level inference, appropri-
ate methods of computation were necessary in order to cope with complexity of system
structures. Exemplary hazards of complexity are multicausality and nonlinearity of
interactions. An appropriate method has been found with probability theory in its
formulation of bayesian networks: It allows for modelling of global processes by means of
structures of local dependencies, while employing a mode of inference (marginalization,
resp. integration) which is insensitive to the form of the actual functional dependencies.
The Kirk-Coleman-model proved to be a grateful toy for application of the methodology
and was modified in order to fit its requirements and include modern theories as Subjective
Expected Utility and Social Impact Theory. Furthermore a method for translation of
System Representation into bayesian network Representation has been proposed.
Two types of calculations were undertaken with the modified Kirk-Coleman-model:
First, a monte-carlo parameter study which led to the conclusion of convergence of the
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process towards joint uniform distribution under all instantiated conditions; and second,
an actual realization of level-transitory explanation. A classification of states of the model
according to Balance-theory has been introduced and effects of macroscopic state-classes
on a particular agent property (one time-step later in the model) have been computed.
Problematic issues concerning the modelling task were associated with the em-
ployed algorithms and software. It turned out that even a “toy-application” like the
modified Kirk-Coleman model easily puts bayesian networks inference algorithms to
their limits. Only sampling algorithms seemed to deliver appropriate performance. Due
to problems with the employed implementation of Gibbs-Sampling I finally used the
Likelihood-Weighting algorithm. It turned out that application of standard simulation
methods for modelling combined with separate bayesian network analysis of generated
model data would have been a more practical approach. Reasons for this would be greater
ease of implementation and enhanced speed of computation.
12.2 Outlook
There are some possible directions of future research which emanate from this work.
One direction would be to deepen its considerations regarding stability and emer-
gence. I will track this path for personal interest, but the issue is complicated and has not
yet revealed a promising starting point. What seems more promising is the application
of the methodology to empirical problems. Either to structural analysis of rather
small and completely surveyed social systems, or large scale data, utilizing structural
proxy-assumptions. The latter enterprise would certainly demand modified methods
of computation, like Synergetic or Bayesian Hierarchical Models , to name examples.
Experimenting with this is in fact part of a plan about what to do this summer.
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Appendix A
Online Provision
Appendixes can be accessed online at the following location:
http://www.stud.uni-giessen.de/ st1334/MicroMacro/append.html
The reason for online provision is to enable direct code-access.
Since its amount adds up to 65 pages the reader might excuse its absence.
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Appendix B
Complete Monte-Carlo Results
Nevertheless, the reader should not be deprived of a plot of the dynamics of the complete
set variables in the model:
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Figure B.1: Plot displaying dynamics of expectations and entropies of all variables simul-
taneously.
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